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ABSTRACT 
 
There  has  been  a  growing  debate  regarding  the  role  of  the  government  and  the  effects  of 
agricultural policies and interventions on agricultural markets. This therefore prompted this 
study to analyse the role of Malawi Agricultural Commodity Exchange (MACE) project as a 
market-enhancing intervention on aggregate market performance in Malawi using cointegration 
methods.  MACE  was introduced to  improve agricultural market  functioning  through market 
information system. The study specifically examined the extent of spatial rice market integration, 
causality relationships among spatially separated markets and the dynamic adjustments of rice 
price series. The study used monthly price series data from 1994 to 2007 obtained from the 
ministry of agriculture. The data was divided into three sets; full sample, Pre-MACE and Post-
MACE. Stationarity tests were done and it was noted that Salima and Bangula for full sample 
and Chitipa for Pre and Post-MACE price series were stationary in levels implying that these 
markets did not share the long-term trend with the major urban centres in Malawi in their 
respective samples. 
 
Cointegration results have shown that spatial rice market integration in Malawi is on average 
marginally  improving.  Compared  to  Pre-MACE  period,  cointegration  and  interdependence 
among markets appeared to be increasing during the Post-MACE era. Cointegration has also 
revealed that rice markets have been operating as a unified market system over the period of 
study. However, the study left out other factors affecting market integration due to financial and 
time constraints hence this improvement can not be fully accredited to MACE intervention. 
 
Nevertheless, since the aggregate picture observed in this study is an improvement of market 
integration the study recommends a promotion of MACE intervention to reach even more remote 
areas. The project needs to consider collecting and disseminating other market information such 
as trade flows, transaction costs and transfer costs. The study also recommends that further 
studies  on  market  integration  should  take  care  of  other  structural  determinants  of  market 
integration such as marketing infrastructure e.g. transportation, government policies and should 
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There  have  been  continued  debates  worldwide  concerning  the  appropriate  role  of  the 
government in the market place and the effects of agricultural policies and interventions on 
agricultural markets. This has therefore forced researchers to develop various methods in order 
to analyse market efficiency and its linkages to various agricultural policies and interventions 
(Galushko, 2003). Studies have observed that an intervention can only be justified if it does not 
enhance distortions into the market and, moreover, remedies the existing market imperfections. 
But how can one observe whether the policy proves to improve the functioning of the markets or 
results in even more inefficiency? One way to throw some light on this long-standing issue 
according to Uchezuba (2005) and Galushko (2003) is to analyse aggregate market performance 
by studying spatial market integration using co-integration methods.  
 
Co-integration analysis is concerned with the existence of a stable relation among prices in 
different localities. Prices move from time to time, and their margins are subject to various 
shocks. When a long run linear relation exists among different series, these series are said to be 
co-integrated (Engle and Granger, 1987). The presence of co-integration between two series is 
indicative  of  interdependence;  its  absence  indicates  market  segmentation.  In  particular,  a 
segmented link is one where co-integration is rejected in both directions along which the link 
can be traced, where as an integrated link is one where co-integration is accepted in at least one 
direction (Goletti et. al. 1995 and Goletti and Babu, 1994).  
 
   2 
Market integration measurement has been viewed by a number of authors as a basic tool for 
understanding how markets work (Ravallion, 1986). According to Barrett (1996), studies of 
market integration provide information on market performance which is necessary for proper 
policy  formulation  and  macroeconomic  modelling.  If  markets  are  not  spatially  or  inter-
temporally  integrated  it  could  be  indicative  that  market  inefficiencies  exist  as  a  result  of, 
amongst others, collusion and market concentration which result in price fixing and distortions 
in the market. In such cases cross-sectional or intertemporal aggregation of demand and supply 
loses its logical foundation (Barrett, 1996). The result is that agricultural producers will fail to 
specialize  according  to  long-run  comparative  advantages  and  gains  from  trade  will  not  be 
realized (Baulch, 1997). This  implies  that if the assumptions  of marketing integration hold, 
optimal allocation of scarce resources could be attained. 
 
In Malawi, spatial market integration is increasingly becoming a popular and an important area 
of  empirical  research  in  food  markets  due  to  commencement  of  several  policies  and 
interventions  that  aim  at  improving  food  market  performance.  These  policies  and  market-
enhancing  interventions  include  market  liberalisation  introduced  in  1987  (Goletti  and  Babu, 
1994) and Malawi Agricultural Commodity Exchange (MACE) initiated in 2004 (Phiri, 2006). 
The expectation from market liberalisation policies was that reduced government intervention 
would  pave  the  way  for  well-functioning  markets  to  emerge,  providing  better  price  and 
production incentives for the farmers (Rashid, 2004).  
 
However, two decades of experience had shown unequivocally mixed results. Chirwa (2001, 
1999) and Goletti and Babu (1994) reported that market liberalisation in Malawi had improved 
spatial market integration which implied improved market performance. On the other hand, Phiri 
(2006); Kherallah, et. al., (2002); and Chilowa (1998) noted that instead of boosting production, 
rapid  liberalization  policies  resulted  in  output  reduction  in  many  developing  and  transition   3 
economies such as Malawi. This therefore revealed a shortfall in market liberalisation policies. 
Phiri (2006) and Goletti and Babu (1994) observed that the success of market liberalization 
policies depends on the strength of transmission of price signals among the markets in various 
regions of a country. This then necessitates the need for the development of a functional market 
information system. It is in this view then that MACE project was introduced to run a market 
information system in order to strengthen the liberalised markets (Phiri, 2006). 
 
MACE project was specifically introduced to help farmers, especially smallholder poor farmers 
in remote rural areas, to access better markets and prices for their produce through a Market 
Information System (MIS). The successful market information system is believed to enable the 
price system to work as a mechanism for communicating information to both producers and 
consumers. For producers, prices direct resources and for consumers, prices reflect society‟s 
costs of production in a world of scarce resources (Galushko, 2003). This then has the capacity 
to improve market performance and efficiency. However, the success of this intervention to 
enhance market efficiency remains blurred as no study has been done. This therefore called for 
the need for this study on spatial market integration to give some light into it.  
1.2 Problem Statement  
In Malawi the performance of agricultural markets especially for staples remains a critical issue 
as it ensures that food is available and accessible to all. Agricultural markets play a vital role in 
food security initiatives especially in developing countries like Malawi. Therefore, any initiative 
that aims at enhancing the performance of the markets is an issue of concern by the majority. As 
such, any study that attempts to understand food-marketing performance to solve the problem of 
food insecurity is not only relevant but also necessary. This then implies that the study of spatial 
rice market integration in Malawi as it relates to Malawi Agricultural Commodity Exchange has 
a critical role to inform future food policy and food security initiatives.    4 
The Malawi Agricultural Commodity Exchange is an institutional arrangement introduced to 
improve  marketing  performance  in  the  agricultural  sector  by  lowering  transaction  costs, 
improving market coordination, ensuring availability of price information and improving access 
of the poor to new input and output markets (IDEAA, 2004). By dissemination of pro-poor 
market information the project was expected to enhance market efficiency and competitiveness 
in the agricultural sector, improve bargaining power of smallholder farmers in the market place 
and provide a fair market price discovery mechanism (Phiri, 2006).  
 
However, very little is known about how the agricultural markets, especially for staple food, are 
performing  in  the  years  following  MACE  intervention.  There  have  been  a  lot  of  efforts  to 
implement the project and enhance market efficiency and competitiveness, but its role on this 
area is not yet clear as no effort has been made to monitor the project and its activities. It still 
remains  blurred  as  to  whether  there  is  an  improvement  in  agricultural  market  performance 
especially  for  staples  after  MACE  intervention.  This  study  therefore  attempts  to  fill  this 
knowledge gap by analyzing how the extent and nature of rice market integration has improved 




Studies of spatial market integration have been done in Malawi, but no study has specifically 
examined the role of MACE project on food market integration. As such, the extent to which 
spatial market integration has improved over time is not known. The nature of price transmission 
across markets which, implies causality relationships is also not clear. Again some important 
questions remain unanswered. First, if there is a price shock in one market, how much of that 
shock is being transmitted to the other market? Second, how long does it take for a price shock 
in one market to be transmitted to another market (Abdula, 2005)? Has MACE project had any 
impact in these areas? This study therefore attempted to provide solutions to these questions   5 
using rice markets. In Malawi, rice is the second most important food crop after maize and its 
role on the country‟s food security initiatives can not be overlooked. In Africa, rice and wheat 
followed by maize, yams and cassava constitute main food crops. In addition to that rice is a 
staple food for nearly half of the world‟s population.  
  
This study was therefore essential as it helped to identify groups of integrated rice markets so 
that unnecessary government intervention in the agricultural markets in general and rice markets 
in particular may be avoided (Ghosh, 2003). Duplication of interventions to spatially separated 
markets can otherwise be undertaken at a higher cost (Goletti et al., 1995). By giving a more 
detailed  picture  of  the  process  of  transmission  of  incentives  across  the  marketing  chain, 
knowledge  of  market  integration  is  relevant  to  the  success  of  policies  such  as  market 
liberalization, price stabilization programmes and food security programmes (Amha, 1999).  
 
The integration of food markets enhances regional food security by ensuring regional balance 
among  food-deficit,  food-surplus  and  non-food  cash  crop-producing  regions  (Goletti  et  al., 
1995).  When,  however,  food  markets  are  not  integrated,  local  food  scarcity  will  persist,  as 
localized deficient markets fail to send the right signals to the surplus markets to attract supplies 
of food grains. As such, this study would help in food policy implementation to enhance the 
country‟s household food security initiatives. The study would also help policy makers to be 
cognizant of the fact that it takes some time for a price to be transmitted across regional markets, 
understand and consider the adjustment period, which might make the policy more successful. 
More importantly it would also aid MACE implementers to have an aggregate picture of the 
direction and progress of the project in meeting its objectives. This is one way of monitoring the 
project's impact. The results would be an indicator of performance which may be used to further 
refine implementation.  
   6 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
The  main  objective  of  this  study  was  to  examine  spatial  rice  market  integration  in  Malawi 
following  the  commencement  of  the  Malawi  Agricultural  Commodity  Exchange  project. 
Specific objectives were: 
1)  To characterise the rice markets in Malawi in terms of production trends and prices 
2)  To determine the extent of spatial market integration of the rice markets and understand 
how it has been affected by MACE intervention  
3)  To  determine  the  causal  relationships  among  spatial  locations  of  the  rice  markets 
following the introduction of MACE intervention  
4)  To determine the dynamic adjustments to long-run equilibrium of spatial rice markets 
and understand how it has been affected by MACE intervention  
1.4 Hypotheses of the Study 
1)  Malawi Agricultural Commodity Exchange project has had an effect on the extent of 
spatial integration of the rice markets 
2)  Malawi Agricultural Commodity Exchange project has had an effect on the long-run 
causality relationships among spatial locations of the rice markets   
3)  MACE project has had an effect on the dynamic adjustments to long-run equilibrium on 
spatial rice markets 
 
   7 
CHAPTER TWO 
2.0 MALAWI AGRICULTURE COMMODITY EXCHANGE (MACE) PROJECT 
2.1 Background 
The project became active on September 1, 2004 and is being implemented within the overall 
project framework of Initiative for Development and Equity in African Agriculture (IDEAA). 
IDEAA  programme  started  in  1997  as  a  regional  programme  with  an  overall  objective  of 
improving  productivity  and  income  streams  of  smallholder  farmers  in  Botswana,  Lesotho, 
Malawi, Swaziland, South Africa and Zimbabwe with funding from the Rockefeller Foundation 
and Kellogg  Foundation. The programme however underwent  restructuring in  August  2003, 
which was mainly influenced by the restructuring of the Kellogg Foundation and resulted into 
the  closure  of  IDEAA  as  a  regional  programme  in  all  the  countries  with  the  exception  of 
Malawi, which was being wholly funded by the Rockefeller Foundation (IDEAA, 2004). During 
phase  two  Malawi  had  chosen  to  work  on  the  commercialization  of  cassava  through  the 
development of stable cassava markets. While working on cassava, a need arose for a functional 
market  information  system  to  support  cassava  market  development.  This  then  led  to  the 
development of an agricultural Market Information System (MIS).  
IDEAA-MIS  aimed  at  providing  market  information  and  linking  buyers  and  sellers  of 
agricultural  produce  to  address  some  problems  associated  with  marketing  of  agricultural 
produce. The overall goal of the programme was to make markets work better for poor farmers 
and  lower  the  huge  risks  and  transaction  costs  that  hinder  market  development  in  Malawi, 
working on the principle of an agricultural commodity exchange. This conceptualization of MIS 
then  gave  birth  to  Malawi  Agriculture  Commodity  Exchange  (MACE)  to  run  a  commodity 
neutral project and to ensure sustainability of the project beyond donor funding (IDEAA, 2005).    8 
2.2 Specific Objectives of MACE   
1.  Facilitate linkages between sellers and buyers, exporters and importers of agricultural 
commodities;  
2.  Empower farmers, traders, processors, and other market participants with relevant and 
timely marketing information and intelligence that enhances their bargaining power and 
competitiveness in the market place;  
3.  Provide a transparent and competitive price discovery mechanism;  
4.  Harness and apply the power of information and communication technologies (ICTs) as 
a strategic tool for rural value addition and empowerment.  
2.3 Components of MACE MIS  
The Hub: The hub is the powerhouse of MACE activities and the secretariat of IDEAA. The 
hub receives all the information from the centres, processes it and sends it back to the centres 
and other interested users.  
 
Market Information Centres (MIC): A MIC is established to manage and service a number of 
MIPs  which  are  located  in  rural  market  centres.  There  are  three  MICs  located  in  Mzuzu, 
Lilongwe and Blantyre. A MIC is equipped with Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICTs): landline and mobile phones, fax and computer with email and internet connectivity. 
  
Market Information Point (MIP): A MIP is an information kiosk located at a rural market 
centre. A MIP serves as a source of marketing information and intelligence, and also as a trading 
floor to link buyers and sellers of commodities in a transparent and competitive manner. There 
are currently 10 MIPs in the following areas: Karonga, Rumphi, Jenda, Kasungu, Mitundu, Lobi, 
Lizulu, Liwonde, Muloza, and Mwanza.   9 
2.4 Operations of MACE 
The basic operation of MACE is to operate a Trading Floor at a MIP. This involves provision of 
writing boards for displaying offers and bids by sellers and buyers respectively. Other services 
include:  
 
Mass  media:  MACE  in  collaboration  with  the  Malawi  Broadcasting  Corporation  (MBC), 
ICRISAT and Sasakawa global 2000 run a Radio program to disseminate price information. The 
MBC radio network covers the whole country even in remote areas, and is therefore widely 
listened to by the public, including smallholder rural farmers. 
 
The Mobile Phone SMS: SMS is text messages sent and received with mobile phones. MACE 
is harnessing this technology to disseminate wholesale price market information in collaboration 
with Telecom Networks Malawi (TNM).  
 
Regional  and  international  market  linkages:  MACE  is  linked  to  some  regional  and 
international  markets  to  facilitate  export  and  import  transactions.  For  example,  Kenya 
Agricultural Commodity Exchange (KACE) limited. 
2.5 Mace Project and Spatial Market Integration 
Although MACE project is perceived as a market-enhancing strategy in Malawi to increase the 
performance of local markets its performance must be evaluated. Galushko (2003) observed that 
the study of spatial market integration is one way to measure the extent of market performance. 
Spatial market integration is defined by Uchezuba (2005) and Goletti (1995) as co-movement of 
prices, or in general, the smooth transmission of price signals and information across spatially 
separated markets.  
   10 
In addition Ghosh (2003) described spatial market integration as a situation in which the prices 
of a commodity in spatially separated markets move together and price signals and information 
are transmitted smoothly. Uchezuba (2005) also observed that for markets to be integrated there 
must  be  free  flow  of  goods  between  markets  and  the  markets  must  be  linked  by  efficient 
arbitrage. The efficient arbitrage condition is fulfilled when price spreads between markets are 
less than or equal to transaction costs. If markets are co-integrated there is evidence that the 
markets have a long-run relationship and that their prices in the long-run will not diverge from 
each other. This implies that the study of market integration usually tries to characterize the 
degree of co-movement of prices across spatially separated markets. 
 
The issue of spatial market integration in Malawi is important because of its implications on 
household  food security.  Nkendah and Nzouessin  (2006) observed that the  concept of  food 
security implies equilibrium between supply and demand on various markets. This however, is 
more  effective  when  there  is  spatial  integration  between  markets.  The  absence  of  such 
integration can constitute a signal of food insecurity because the technique of the arbitration 
which  allows  surplus  areas  to  supply  the  deficit  areas  would  be  difficult  to  realize.  More 
importantly, market integration is often used by economists as a proxy for market efficiency 
(Vinuya, 2003). As such, understanding of spatial rice market integration leads to understanding 
of the performance of rice markets and this is a pre-requisite to realisation of more effective and 
efficient market services. This perception according to RATES (2003) creates an incentive for 
boosting food production to realise sustainable household food security.  
 
Spatial market performance may be evaluated in terms of a relationship between the prices of 
spatially  separated  markets  (Uchezuba  2005).  Meyer  (2002)  observed  that  spatial  price 
behaviour in regional markets may be used as a measure of overall market performance.   11 
Since prices are readily available and generally considered as the most reliable information on 
marketing systems in developing economies, market integration studies have been restricted to 
the interdependence of prices of spatially separated markets (Rashid, 2004). This study therefore 
evaluated spatial integration of rice markets in Malawi as a proxy to understanding how rice 
markets are performing since the commencement of MACE project. 
2.6 Food Markets, Marketing Policies and Reforms in Malawi 
In  Malawi,  during  the  pre-colonial  era  most  commodity  exchanges  presumably  took  place 
informally with seller or buyer approaching the other when the exchange was needed. Around 
1900s formal produce markets or market place started in some parts of the country notably; 
Blantyre,  Zomba  and  Lilongwe.  State  marketing  then  came  in  around  1920s  with  the 
establishment of the Native Tobacco Board (NTB) in 1926, Maize Control Board (MCB) and 
the Cotton Control Board (CCB) in 1949. In 1956, all the three boards were incorporated into 
the  Agricultural  Production  and  Marketing  Board  (APMB)  (Chirwa,  1999).  In  1962  the 
Agricultural Production and Marketing Board was superseded by the Farmers Marketing Board 
(FMB)  which  was  replaced  by  an  Agricultural  Development  and  Marketing  Corporation 
(ADMARC) in  1971. The creation of ADMARC  as  a parastatal  organization was  meant  to 
create a more effective and efficient market system for smallholder farmers (Nucifora, 2004). 
 
Although ADMARC meant to reduce marketing problems in Malawi it was later recognized that 
state dominated enterprises were inefficient and impeded development and economic growth by 
severely limiting gains from specialization and trade (Phiri, 2006). Because of the importance of 
agriculture  in  the  Malawian  economy,  Government  then  committed  to  far-reaching  reforms 
between 1981 and 1994 of which liberalization of markets for agricultural inputs and products 
took  a  centre  stage  (Phiri,  2006;  Chirwa,  1999  and  Simler,  1997).  Expectations  were  that   12 
reduced government intervention would quickly pave the way for well-functioning markets to 
emerge, providing better price and production incentives for farmers (Rashid, 2004).  
 
However,  two  decades  of  experience  with  market  liberalisation  showed  surprisingly  mixed 
results.  Instead  of  boosting  production,  empirical  studies  showed  that  rapid  liberalization 
policies had resulted in output reduction in many developing and transition economies such as 
Malawi (Phiri 2006; Kherallah, et. al. 2002; and Chilowa 1998). These studies revealed that lack 
of  efficient  and  effective  market  information  system  was  one  of  the  reasons  for  this 
unanticipated outcome (Phiri, 2006 and IDEAA, 2005). Goletti and Babu (1994) observed that 
the success of market liberalization policy depends on the strength of transmission of price 
signals among the markets in various regions of a country. As such development of a functional 
market information system becomes a pre-requisite to strengthen liberalized markets through 
transmission of timely and efficient market information.  
 
This recognition saw Malawi establishing Agricultural Market Information System (MIS) as an 
institutional framework with an overall goal of providing market information in order to make 
markets work better for resource poor farmers (IDEAA, 2004). The conceptualisation of MIS 
gave  birth  to  Malawi  Agricultural  Commodity  Exchange  (MACE)  for  sustainability  of  the 
market  information  system  programme.  MACE  was  intended  to  help  farmers,  especially 
smallholder poor farmers in remote rural areas, to access better markets and prices for their 
produce through market information system (MIS). It is argued that modern information and 
communication technology has a potential to deliver information to rural communities, and thus 
contribute to poverty alleviation (Mukhebi, 2004).   13 
CHAPTER THREE 
3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 The Concept of Market and Price Analysis 
In a market driven economy, the marketing system serves at both the micro and macro levels as 
mechanism to transmit to market participants, information that is useful in decision making. 
Transparent,  accurate  and  timely  price  signals  play  a  significant  role  in  the  conduct  and 
performance of an efficient marketing system. In a competitive economy the pricing mechanism 
is expected to transmit orders and directions to determine the flow of market activities. Pricing 
signals guide and regulate production, consumption and marketing decisions over time, form 
and space (Kohls and Uhl, 1998). Identifying the causes of differences in prices in interregional 
or spatially separated markets has therefore become an important economic analytical tool to 
understand markets better. The next section explores this concept. 
3.1.1  Spatial Arbitrage Price Analysis 
According to Negassa et.al. (2003), the price relationships between spatially separated markets 
are generally analyzed within the framework of spatial price equilibrium theory developed by 
Enke  (1951),  Samuelson  (1964)  and  Takayama  and  Judge  (1964).  The  key  assumption 
underpinning  spatial  price  equilibrium  theory  is  that  price  relationships  between  spatially 
separated competitive markets depend on the size of transaction costs. This implies  that the 
principle underlying the differences  between  regions  in  a competitive market  structure with 
homogeneous commodities is that price differences between any two regional markets that trade 
with each other should equal transaction cost, while in a situation of autarky price differences 
will be less than or equal to transaction costs (Tomek and Robinson, 1990). These are called 
spatial arbitrage conditions (Faminow and Benson, 1990).  
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When  the  price  difference  between  different  markets  exceeds  transaction  costs,  arbitrage 
opportunities  will  be  created  and  profit  seeking  merchants  will  seek  to  exploit  such 
opportunities,  by  purchasing  commodities  from  a  low-price  surplus  market  and  transferring 
them to a higher-priced deficit market.  
 
Arbitrage  opportunities  occur  only  when  the  deviation  in  prices  is  substantial  enough  for 
potential profit to exceed the cost of trading. This will raise prices in the surplus region and 
reduce them in the deficit region (Tomek and Robinson, 1990). This concept of constant market 
price and arbitrage are consistent with the “law of one price” (LOOP). The "law of one price" 
states that, under competitive market conditions, all prices within a market are uniform after 
taking into consideration the cost of adding place, time and form utility to the products within 
the market (Kohls and Uhl, 1998). The LOOP is useful in determining the size of a market, 
predicting  price  changes  within  a  market  and  evaluating  the  pricing  efficiency  of  a  market 
(Kohls and Uhl, 1998). Failure of one or more regions to adhere to the LOOP means that the 
regions  may  not  be  linked  by  arbitrage,  or  certain  factors  act  as  impediments  to  efficient 
arbitrage  e.g.  trade  barriers,  government  intervention  policy,  imperfect  information  and  risk 
aversion.  
3.1.2  Spatial Market Integration 
Spatial market integration refers to co-movement of prices across spatially separated markets 
(Uchezuba, 2005). In the case of two trading markets (A and B), market integration implies that 
price changes in one market are manifested to an identical price response in the other market 
(Vinuya, 2007 and Goletti et al., 1995). The intuitive idea behind the measurement of market 
integration is to understand the interaction among prices in spatially separated markets. Figure 1 
illustrates this concept and dynamics of integration between two markets.    15 
 
Figure 1: Interaction Between Two Markets; Source: Vinuya (2007) 
 
Vinuya (2007) stated that if there are two markets A and B, which are completely separated 
from each other, the prices of the same commodity should not be related. If for example in an 
area where market A is located experiences a supply shock due to a bad harvest, prices will 
suddenly  increase.  In  market  B,  there  is  no  reason  to  assume  that  a  bad  harvest  has  also 
occurred. In the absence of information flows between the two markets, prices in B would not 
show any movement. However if, A and B were integrated, the price in B would also increase. 
This is because some food would flow from B to A decreasing the available supply in B. At the 
same time the price in A would be lower than in the absence of market integration (Vinuya, 
2007 and Goletti et.al., 1995). This co-movement of prices will equilibrate prices at p‟ in both 
markets and Vinuya (2007) calls this principle the Law of One Price (LOOP). Therefore, the co-
movement of prices gives an indication of the degree of market integration.  
 
Goletti et.al. (1995) further noted that for two pairs of markets (A, B) and (A′, B′) exhibiting the 
same price co-movement can show a different process of price adjustment. This suggests that the 
dynamics of price adjustment may also give important information about the integration of the   16 
two markets. If, for example, price shocks from A to B take longer to be transmitted than from 
A′ to B′, even though the index of price co-movement between A and B is the same as between 
A′ and B′, then the second pair is more integrated than the first one. 
 
Market integration can also be defined as a measure of the extent to which demand and supply 
shocks in one location are transmitted to other locations (Negassa et al., 2003). Barrett (1996) 
distinguished market integration into (i) vertical market integration involving different stages in 
marketing and processing channels, spatial integration relating to spatially distinct markets, and 
(ii) inter-temporal market integration which refers to arbitrage across periods of time. Based on 
the definition by Gonzalez-Revera and Helfand (2001), a market within a distinct location is 
considered integrated if physical flows of goods and services exist among the locations and there 
is evidence of a long run relationship. These criteria are important in identifying the sets of 
locations that are directly or indirectly spatially linked by trade. In light of these assertions 
several studies have attempted to provide a better understanding of how specific markets work 
through different measurements of market integration. Goletti et. al., (1995) and Goletti and 
Babu (1994) reported that the intuitive idea behind the measurement of market integration is to 
understand the interaction among prices in spatially separated markets.   
3.2 Measures of Spatial Market Integration  
3.2.1  Bivariate Correlation Coefficients 
One simple way to study market integration is to consider the correlation of price series for 
different markets (Negassa et. al., 2003). This is intuitively related to the idea that integrated 
markets exhibit prices that move together. Price correlations are the easiest way to measure these 
co-movements.  However,  the  traditional  tests  of  market  integration  focused  on  correlation 
coefficients of spatial prices mask the presence of other synchronous factors, such as general 
price inflation, seasonality, population growth, procurement policy, etc (Goletti et. al., 1995).   17 
Several  researchers  have  therefore  questioned  the  usability  of  bivariate  price  correlation  to 
investigate the degree of market integration, for example: 
  Negassa  et.  al.  (2003)  and  Barrett  (1996)  found  that  bivariate  price  correlation  may 
overstate the lack of price integration if a lag in market information produces a lag in the 
price response between markets. 
  Barret  (1996)  argues  that  the  bivariate  approach  is  weak  because  it  produces  high 
correlation results even for markets with no physical linkage. In addition, price data of 
reasonably high frequency are often synonymous with the heteroscedasticity problem 
and a simple pair wise price correlation statistic will fail to recognize the presence of 
heteroscedasticity inherent in such price data series. 
  Golletti et. al., (1995) state that bivariate analysis masks the presence of certain factors 
such as general price inflation, effects of government policies, etc.  
  Sexton et. al. (1991) and Ravallion (1986) state that bivariate price correlation assumes 
instantaneous price adjustment and cannot capture the dynamic nature of a marketing 
system. There is a high tendency of spurious market integration because the prices may 
tend to move together even though markets are not integrated.  
  According  to  Delgado  (1986),  bivariate  correlation  coefficients  have  presented  a 
distorted picture by indicating relatively low price correlation between the markets even 
in cases where evidence suggests competitive and rational behaviour by a large number 
of  market  participants.  He  argues  that  bivariate  correlation  analysis  is  a  pair-wise 
analysis  of  two  markets;  difficulties  arise  when  more  than  two  markets  are  to  be 
analyzed and compared. 
One  way  to  take  care  of  some  of  these  criticisms  is  to  consider  the  correlation  of  price 
differences,  which  has  the  attractive  property  of  interpreting  market  integration  as 
interdependence of price changes in different markets. Moreover, price change would largely   18 
eliminate common trends that introduce spurious correlation (Goletti et. al., 1995). Besides the 
problem  of  spurious  correlation,  there  are  other  serious  problems  related  to  the  often  non-
stationary  nature  of  the  price  series  involved.  These  problems  are  addressed  by  the  co-
integration analysis described in the following paragraphs. 
3.2.2  Co-Integration Analysis 
Co-integration  analysis  is  an  alternative  procedure  for  evaluating  spatial  market  linkage  by 
taking the presence of stochastic trends in the price series into account. It was developed and 
applied in  earlier  work  by Engle and Granger  (1987) and  also  Engle  and Yoo (1987).  Co-
integration analysis is concerned with the existence of a stable relation among prices in different 
localities. Prices move from time to time, and their margins are subject to various shocks. When 
a long-run linear relation exists among different series, these series are said to be co-integrated 
(Engle and Granger, 1987). The presence of co-integration between two series is indicative of 
interdependence; its absence indicates market segmentation. In particular, a segmented link is 
one  where  co-integration  is  rejected  in  both  directions  along  which  the  link  can  be  traced, 
whereas an integrated link is one where co-integration is accepted in both directions. 
 
Co-integration has been regarded by many researchers as not absolute but a measure of degree 
of market integration (Gonzalez-Rivera and Helfand, 2001, and Goodwin and Schroeder, 1991). 
Spatial market prices that diverge from each other for a long time would have a weak long-run 
relationship while two prices that co-move are likely to be cointegrated. According to Goodwin 
and Schroeder (1991) various factors affect co-integration, e.g. transaction cost, risk associated 
in  transacting  business  and  influence  of  volume  of  trade.  Low-volume  markets  have  the 
tendency of large price variability and the distance between markets has a great influence on 
transaction costs. This idea is consistent with the findings of Goletti et al., (2005) in describing 
the influence of structural factors in determining market integration.   19 
According  to  Barrett  (1996),  co-integration  is  unfortunately  not  a  sufficient  tool  for  spatial 
market analysis. Negassa et. al., (2003) and Barrett (1996) pointed out that, if transaction costs 
are  non-stationary,  a  failure  to  find  co-integration  between  two  market  price  series  may  be 
completely consistent with market integration. In other words, co-integration may be assumed 
unnecessary, because price can be co-integrated without the market being integrated or efficient 
(Negassa et. al., 2003; Baulch, 1997; Fackler, 1996, and Barrett, 1996). Barrett (1996) asserts 
that the insufficiency of co-integration as a tool for spatial market analysis stems from the fact 
that, if the coefficient  of prices  in  the central  market  is  negative, a negative relationship  is 
observed,  implying  that  prices  move  in  the  opposite  direction  rather  than  co-movement  as 
indicated  by  the  concept  of  market  integration.  The  magnitude  of  the  price  co-integration 
coefficient  may  diverge  far  from  one,  contradicting  the  intuition  behind  market  integration 
hypothesis.  
 
Co-integration methodology has been used in Malawi by several authors. Notable ones include 
Chirwa (2001) whose results suggested that the markets for maize, rice, beans and groundnuts 
were integrated and price liberalization had enhanced the degree of market integration. Chirwa 
(1999) also used cointegration methods and reported that markets for rice a crop with complete 
price liberalization were more integrated than markets for maize in which the governments still 
imposed  a  price  band  for  ADMARC.  Goletti  and  Babu  (1994)  also  applied  co-integration 
technique and concluded that liberalization had increased market integration in Malawi. Co-
integration tests highlighted that most of the markets had a stable long-term relations over the 
period of analysis, from 1984 to 1991. These studies, however, can not answer the question of 
how much MACE intervention has done to improve market integration. Much as studies have 
given empirical evidence that market liberalisation has improved food market integration, no 
study has been done in relation to the impact of MACE project.   20 
3.2.3  Granger Causality Analysis 
The existence of cointegration among a set of variables implies Granger causality, which, under 
certain restrictions, can be tested within Johansen‟s cointegration framework by standard Wald 
tests (Rashid, 2004). The Granger causality test is therefore used in order to assess the nature of 
price transmission across markets (and through different marketing levels). Basically, Granger 
Causality  Test  is  accepted  as  another  approach  to  test  market  integration  (Abdula,  2005). 
Gujarati (2003) observed that a time series of prices in market i is said to “Granger cause” 
another time series of prices in market j if current and lagged values of prices in market i 
improve prediction of prices in market j. In simple words, Abdula (2005) reported causality as a 
basic measure of the predictability of prices, that is, price movements in one market can be used 
to forecast price changes in other markets. 
 
Some empirical studies were done in Malawi applying the granger causality approach to test 
market integration. For example Chirwa (2001) on food pricing reforms and price transmission 
found  Blantyre  as  central  in  the  price  transmission  in  the  maize  and  groundnuts  markets, 
Karonga was central in the rice markets and Blantyre and Lilongwe were central to the beans 
market. Chirwa (1999) also noted that Blantyre and Karonga were markets that drove prices of 
other markets for maize and rice, respectively. In 1994 Goletti and Babu (1994) also observed 
that Blantyre, Lilongwe and Zomba were the major central markets, in the sense that their past 
values of prices were important to predict what happens in the remaining markets. However, 
since the inception of MACE project no study has been done in this area, hence it is not known 
which markets are now influencing others.  
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3.2.4  Dynamic Adjustments 
Often it is not enough to say that markets are integrated. One would like to know the extent of 
integration. Segmentation occurs when there is no co-integration. According to Goletti and Babu 
(1994) perfect integration would occur if the price in one market is just a translation of the price 
in the other market, implying that price changes are the same. The translation factor can be 
interpreted as a transfer cost between the two markets (Goletti et. al., 1995). However, it is only 
in extreme cases that perfect integration or segmentation occurs. Most of the time, intermediate 
degrees  of  integration  occur.  The  task  of  the  analyst  is  then  to  work  out  precisely  how  to 
measure  these  different  degrees  and  measure  the  magnitude  of  price  transmission.  The 
immediate impact of price shocks should be distinguished from the impact that builds over time. 
The  process  of  price  transmission  usually  takes  time  as  the  result  of  complex  dynamic 
adjustments. According to Ravallion (1986) a short run and a long-run can be distinguished and 
dynamic multipliers computed from the estimation of distributed lag equations. 
 
The analysis of dynamic adjustments also permits the study of the speed of price transmission, 
i.e., how many days, weeks, or months are needed for prices to be transmitted from one location 
to another. This is an issue of concern to policymakers for reasons related to the planning of 
food distribution and price stabilization. Sometimes the speed of price response is related to the 
efficiency of the market system. However, this assumption is not always valid (Goletti et. al., 
1995). Rapid adjustments are just an indication of the flexibility of the mechanism. They do not 
necessarily imply well-functioning systems.  
 
Chirwa  (2001)  applied  this  methodology  to  analysis  of  food  pricing  reforms  and  price 
transmission in Malawi. It was revealed that in the short-run, on average, the price changes in 
central markets explained between 18 percent (maize) and 70 percent (rice) of the variation in 
the price of peripheral markets. Between 15 percent and 47 percent of the price adjustment to the   22 
long-run equilibrium took place within a month. Applying the same methodology, Goletti and 
Babu (1994) observed that most of the markets in Malawi needed a long time to complete their 
adjustment period. The average mean adjustment period was found to be 5.7 months. However, 
it is not known whether the status is still the same since the commencement of MACE project 
into the market system. Hence this study was designed to fill this gap. 
3.2.5  Impulse Response Functions 
Impulse  response  function  is  a  concept  based  on  the  notion  that  the  economy‟s  dynamic 
behaviour can be well explained by random impulse generated over time by a constant linear 
structure  (Potter,  1998).  This  is  a  useful  approach  in  giving  additional  information  about 
dynamic  interrelationships  among  market  price  pairs  which  can  be  used  to  examine  the 
responses  of  prices  and  price  pairs  to  shocks  (Uchezuba,  2005).  The  concept  of  Impulse 
response functions is used to analyze the impact of price shocks and the way in which shocks are 
transmitted among market prices. Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen (1993) extended this notion to a 
non-linear time series. The standard linear technique was further improved to the non-linear case 
by defining a generalized impulse response function as a random variable on the underlying 
space of the time series (Potter, 1998).  
 
According to Kooper et.al., (1996), impulse response functions can be applied to both univariate 
and multivariate time series.  In the  case of univariate or symmetric adjustment models,  the 
response to a price shock is independent of the history of the time series and the sign and 
magnitude of the postulated shock. However, Goodwin and Piggott (2001) and Potter (1995), 
reported  that  asymmetric  adjustment  models  produce  impulse  response  functions  that  are 
functions of the history of the price series and the sign and magnitude of the shock implying that 
the  size  and  sign  of  the  shock  will  influence  the  nature  of  response.  In  addition,  Baum, 
Barkoulas  and  Mustafa  (2001)  observed  that  shocks  of  different  magnitude  have   23 
disproportionate  effects  and  that  positive  and  negative  shocks  of  the  same  magnitude  have 
different dynamic effects due to asymmetry based on the sign of the shock. 
3.3 Empirical Applications of the Co-Integration Test 
A number of authors have used co-integration analysis in the study of market integration. This 
section therefore reviews studies that have applied this concept of co-integration with the aim of 
comparing various ways the concept is used in relation to spatial market analysis. Liu and Wang 
(2003)  used  Johansen‟s  multivariate  co-integration  to  test  for  egg  market  integration  of  six 
Pacific states in the US using annual price data from 1960 to 1996. They found that there were 
physical flows among the six pacific states which indicate integration. However, the law of one 
price was rejected by testing linear combinations of co-integrating vectors. Due to transaction 
costs, the LOOP was also rejected in many other studies using the integration test involving non-
stationary series (Asche et. al., 2004 and Baffles 1991; Ardeni, 1989).  
 
Thapa (2002) also used the co-integration technique to analyze the impact of Real Effective 
Exchange Rate (REER) on economic activities in  Nepal.  Based on the standard theories  of 
aggregate  demand  and  aggregate  supply  in  an  economy,  the  author  tested  the  relationship 
between REER and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). ADF test revealed that the time series 
data used for the study were not stationary at log levels but at first log differences and that the 
series had a significant time trend. The results further showed that interest rate is not important 
to  boost  economic  activities  while  international  competitiveness  and  labour  costs  are  more 
significant variables in influencing economic activities in Nepal. 
 
Asche et. al., (1999) applied the concept of co-integration and the law of one price to test for 
product aggregation, market integration and relationships between prices in the world salmon 
market  from  1986 to  1996. The objective of the study was  to  investigate whether different 
species of salmon compete in the same market. The Johansen multivariate test was used to   24 
conduct  tests  for law of one  price  (LOOP)  and co-integration. The  results  indicate that the 
markets were co-integrated implying that five species of salmon used in the analysis compete in 
the same market. They also found out that the LOOP and the composite commodity theorem 
hold.  These  findings  have  implications  for  trade  restraining  policy  measures.  The  analysis 
supports the claims that all salmon prices move together in the long-run (co-integrate) with some 
short term deviations. 
 
Diakosavvas (1995) used co-integration analysis based on the ordinary least square approach 
and the time varying parameter estimation approach to examine the market integration between 
Australian and United States (US) beef prices at the farm gate. Using monthly time series data 
from 1972:1 to 1993:2 co-integration was found between Australian and U.S. beef prices. The 
time varying convergence analysis indicates that the degree of convergence between the various 
price pairs has  not  increased over time. The result implies  that Australian prices  cannot  be 
adopted as the world price in empirical analysis.  
 
Golleti and Bapu (1994) also used the same co-integration technique in their analysis of market 
integration in Malawi. The authors worked with data that covered both the period before and 
after market reforms. The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test revealed that all series were 
I(1)
1 and that most of the markets were integrated with the period after reform having more 
integrated markets than the period before.  
 
Goodwin and Schroeder (1991) used a co -integration test of regional price series to evaluate 
spatial linkages in regional cattle markets in the U.S. The aim was to determine the impacts of 
co-integration of several regional markets characteristics. Weekly price series were used from 
January 1980 through September 1987. Co-integration tests were conducted on spatial price 
                                                 
1 Integrated of order one   25 
relationships  among  eleven  regional  markets.  The  result  was  that  several  markets  were  not 
integrated over 1980 through 1987. Market volume, industrial concentration ratio, and distance 
between markets were found to significantly influence co-integration.  
 
The  concept  of  Impulse  response  functions  was  employed  by  Bekkerman  et.al.  (2009)  in 
examining the effects a decision to build an ethanol-fuel production facility near one of the corn 
markets Northampton county, North Carolin on prices. Due to the proximity of the ethanol plant 
site to the two corn processor sites, it was expected that a rise in the demand for corn would 
trigger an associated rise in prices, which may have impacted, through market linkages, prices in 
other North Carolina corn markets. The study reported that for corn, the shock responses end 
between 10 and 20 weekdays while all of the shock responses in the soybean markets lasted 
under one week. Additionally, five of the six market pairs exhibited a movement back toward 
the original price parity relationship while one market pair, the resulting price pair relationship 
was greater than the initial shock amount. 
 
Goodwin and Piggott (1999) utilised the nonlinear impulse response functions to evaluate the 
dynamic  paths  of  adjustments  to  exogenous,  localised  shocks.  The  responses  confirmed 
equilibrating  responses  to  be  consistent  with  price  equalisation  and  integration  of  markets. 
Adjustments were complete after 15 days. Though modest asymmetries were revealed, positive 
and negative shocks generally yielded symmetric responses. However, Bekkerman et.al. (2009) 
noted  that  impulse  response  functions  that  use  the  asymmetric  variable  threshold  model 
parameters  indicate  that  the  magnitude  of  the  shock  as  well  as  the  time-to-price-parity-
equilibrium in the linked markets may be underestimated if a constant thresholds specification is 
implemented. 
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Bamba and Reed (2004) also used impulse response functions to trace the effect of monetary 
shocks on current and future values of coffee and cocoa prices in the United States. The study 
results indicated that a shock in money supply has a negative and immediate impact on coffee 
prices. Baum et.al. (2001) used an impulse response function to support evidence of non-linear 
dynamic structure to purchasing power parity (PPP). Convergence to log-run PPP in the post-
Bretton Wood era was found to be low. Goodwin and Piggott (2001) used an impulse response 
function to study asymmetric price response to shock in U.S. corn and wheat markets. Strong 
evidence to support market integration was found. In their findings, responses to shocks were 
complete after fifteen days. Abdulai (2000) applied an impulse response function to study price 
transmission in Ghanaian maize markets. Wholesale maize prices in Accra and Bolgatanga were 
found to respond more quickly to increases than to decreases in central market prices. 
 
In South Africa, Uchezuba (2005) also employed an impulse response function to evaluate the 
response in the Johannesburg market due to shocks in other local markets. The study utilised the 
non-linear impulse response approach of Potter (1995) also adapted by Koop et.al. (1996). Due 
to  the  non-stationary  nature  of  Johannesburg  prices  and  some  other  market  prices,  shocks 
emanating  from  Johannesburg  were  expected  to  produce  either  temporary  or  permanent 
responses in the alternate local market. The outcome of the analysis indicated that both positive 
and negative shocks lead to almost a similar pattern of adjustment. For example, it took about 
six to twelve months for other fresh produce markets (FPMs) to adjust completely in response to 
a  price  shock  in  the  Johannesburg  FPM.  The  positive  and  negative  shocks  converged  to 
equilibrium and did not show any tendency to deviate from equilibrium in the long run. These 
responses were found to be consistent with long-run market integration.  
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Franken  and  Parcell  (2003)  used  impulse  response  functions  derived  from  Vector 
Autoregressive modeling to investigate the Law of One Price and price relationships among four 
Missouri  grain/oilseed  markets.  The  results  were  consistent  with  the  Law  of  One  Price, 
supporting the ideology that markets work, and implying that localized structural change may 
not significantly affect research shelf-life. The impulse response functions also illustrated little 
evidence that pricing patterns and linkages may have changed, following the structural changes. 
In most cases, the duration of a response for one market location to a shock in another market 
location was nearly the same length prior to and following the structural change events although 
some  improvements  were  observed  during  the  period  following  the  structural  change.  For 
example, the duration of responses to shocks prior to the merger appeared to last 60 days, while 
following the merger the responses had been completed in closer to 50 days for Hannibal and 
Kansas City soybean markets. Thus, the Hannibal and Kansas City soybean markets responded 
to shocks in each other by returning to a long-run equilibrium quicker following the merger than 
prior. 
3.4 Weaknesses and Strengths of Co-Integration Methods                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Due  to  several  criticisms  levelled  against  conventional  approaches  to  testing  for  market 
integration,  there  have  been  remarkable  improvements  and  extensions  over  the  past  three 
decades on these methods (Rashid, 2004). However, despite these improvements Rashid (2004) 
and  Chirwa  (2001)  observed  that  the  conventional  methods  of  market  integration  analyses 
continue to  have limitations in  capturing the complex intricacies of the way markets  work, 
particularly in the developing countries. The co-integration method for example is criticized as 
being unreliable if: i) the transaction costs are non-stationary or are ignored (Goodwin, 2002 and 
Barrett, 1996) and ii) there are reversals in trade flows across markets (Barrett and Li, 2002 and 
Goodwin, 2002).  
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The argument behind non-stationarity of transaction costs is that if transaction costs are non-
stationary, failure to find co-integration between two price series may be consistent with market 
integration (Barrett, 1996). In other words, rejection of co-integration hypothesis according to 
Rashid (2004) may not necessarily mean lack of market integration; it can just be a reflection of 
transfer costs being non-stationary. As such Barrett (1996) concluded that while co-integration 
indicates that a long-run reduced form linear relationship exists between two time series, it is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for market integration. 
 
Nonetheless, despite this criticism of the co-integration approach, Rashid (2004) and Chirwa 
(2001) observed that the conclusions  of  many  available co-integration-based studies  tend to 
refute  this  contention.  Several  co-integration-based  studies  from  countries  of  different 
development levels have concluded in favour of market integration instead of finding no co-
integration. For example; Heman and Fateh (2006) in Pakistan; Rashid (2004) in Uganda; Ghosh 
(2003) in India; Dawson and Dey (2002) in Bangladesh; Chirwa (2001) in Malawi, Gonzalez-
Rivera and Hafland (2001) in Brazil and Chirwa (1999) in Malawi, found co-integration among 
the markets. Nonetheless, Rashid (2004) noted a few cases, such as Alexander and Wyeth 1994, 
where one or two locations in a given set of markets lack integration, but noted that it is hard to 
attribute them entirely to the non-stationarity of transaction costs.  
 
Baulch  (1997)  and  Barrett  (1996)  also  raised  concerns  on  conventional  tests  of  market 
integration on the basis of ignoring transfer costs.  Baulch (1997)  argued that conventional 
methods assume a linear relationship between market prices, not consistent with discontinuities 
in trade implied by the spatial arbitrage conditions, and proposes a Parity Bounds Model (PBM). 
Nonetheless, available empirical studies have differed with Baulch (1997) on the aptness of 
PBM. For example, Chirwa (2001) argued that the use of the parity bounds model rely on best 
estimates of transaction costs, and the model falls short of telling whether trade flows occur.   29 
Zanias (1999) concurred with Chirwa and noted that using proxy transport costs or transaction 
costs may create more problems than they intend to solve. Timmer (1996) also observed that in 
spite  of  sophistication  in  econometric  techniques  the  understanding  of  market  integration 
requires real data on transaction costs and trade flows between spatially separated markets. 
 
A failure of co-integration approach to distinguish various arbitrage conditions, such as autarky, 
efficient arbitrage, and arbitrage failure is another criticism levelled against the co-integration 
method  (Rashid,  2004).  In  co-integration  characterization,  efficient  arbitrage  and  arbitrage 
failures  are  reflected  through  integration  and  non-integration  of  markets.  The  autarkic 
conditions,  however,  are  not  distinguishable.  For  example,  if  „A‟  and  „B‟,  are  two  surplus 
markets whose price differential is less than transfer costs, then the markets will not engage in 
trade.  But  if  both  markets  supply  to  a  major  urban  location,  say  „C‟,  with  which  price 
differentials are large enough to cover the transfer costs, and „A‟ and „B‟ are integrated to „C‟, 
then prices in these markets are likely to co-move over time, as price shocks in „C‟ will be 
transmitted to the other two markets. In this situation, the co-integration results might indicate 
that all three markets are integrated, although there is no trade flow between „A‟ and „B‟. The 
failure to make this distinction is a limitation of co-integration method.  
 
Nevertheless, Rashid (2004) argued that for a small country such as Uganda, this is hardly a 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0 METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Field Methods 
4.1.1  Study Area  
The study focused on nine selected markets across Malawi where rice prices are collected by 
both the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security and IDEAA Malawi. The markets under 
study are: Chitipa, Karonga and Mzuzu from Northern region; Salima, Lilongwe and Chimbiya 
from the Central region; Ntaja, Lunzu, and Bangula from the South and are shown in Appendix 
4. Selection of the markets was based on availability of the data. Mzuzu, Lilongwe and Lunzu 
are the major urban markets in the northern, central and southern region respectively. 
4.1.2  Data Collection and Handling 
The study used secondary data of monthly rice prices from 1994 to 2007. The data were from 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security supplemented by data from IDEAA Malawi. The 
data were cleaned by means of adjusting the prices that were two standard deviations from the 
yearly means as suggested by Goetz and Weber (1986). Missing values were approximated by 
linearly interpolating where there were one to three missing values. Where there were more than 
three missing values, prices from nearby market were placed for missing values because it is 
hypothesized  under  spatial  arbitrage  theory  that  prices  of  the  same  commodity  in  adjacent 
markets tend to move in unison and that they do not divert much from each other according to 
Tomek and Robison (1990).  
 
The data were split into three sets; full sample (January 1994 – December 2007), Pre-MACE 
(January 1994 – August 2004) and post-MACE (September 2004 – December 2007) period. The 
data were deliberately divided into these periods in order to extract the relative importance of 
MACE project on spatial rice market integration in Malawi.   31 
4.2 Analytical Methods 
4.2.1  The Concept of Market Integration 
The concept of co-integration states that if a series Pit (rice price in market i at time t) is non-
stationary but its first difference is stationary, then it is said to be integrated of order one or 
simply integrated, and can be represented as Pit~I(1). Otherwise, if Pit is stationary in levels it is 
said to be integrated of order zero and denoted as Pit~I(0). If two series Pit and Pjt are both I(1) 
then in most cases the linear combination Pit-a-bPjt = εt is also I(1). But it is possible that εt is 
stationary, or I(0). This will only happen if the trends in Pit and Pjt are said to be co-integrated 
with b as the co-integration parameter or coefficient. In general a pair of series Pit and Pjt is said 
to be co-integrated if they are individually I(d), d is the order of integration, but there exists a 
linear combination of them, εt = Pit-a-bPjt, that is I(0) (Greene, 2000). The task in cointegration 
analysis is therefore two fold. The first part is to find out if each of the pair of a time series is 
stationary and secondly, to difference the series until stationarity is achieved (Edriss, 2003). 
 
The measurement of the extent of spatial market integration is still a matter of considerable 
debate conceptually and empirically. Testing whether the arbitrage conditions are met requires 
information  on  prices,  trade  flows  between  markets  and  transfer  costs  (Uchezuba,  2005). 
However, in empirical work only price information is readily available, and empirical tests of 
market integration concentrate on price analysis, which does not reveal whether there are trade 
flows among markets due to price differentials. Barrett (1996) notes that co-movement of prices 
has thus become synonymous with market integration.  
 
The literature suggests several approaches to testing spatial market integration using market 
prices to examine the concept of spatial arbitrage. The conventional tests of market integration,   32 
when only price series data are available, include correlation analysis following Jones (1972) 
and  Lele  (1967),  the  Law  of  One  Price  (LOOP)  (Richardson,  1978),  the  Ravallion  model 
(Ravallion,  1986),  and  the  application  of  new  econometric  techniques  of  co-integration  and 
Granger causality (Palaskas and Harriss-White, 1993; Alexander and Wyeth, 1994). 
 
Given that only price information from private traders is collected in Malawi (Chirwa, 2001), 
this study tests the existence of long-run equilibrium relationships among the main markets 
using the co-integration analysis. Co-integration analysis is concerned with the existence of a 
stable relation among prices in different localities (Goletti et. al., 1995). Prices move from time 
to time, and their margins are subject to various shocks. When a long-run linear relation exists 
among different series, these series are said to be co-integrated. The presence of co-integration 
between two series is indicative of interdependence; its absence indicates market segmentation. 
In particular, a segmented link is one where co-integration is rejected in both directions along 
which the link can be traced. Following Engel and Granger (1987), the co-integration model is 
composed of two steps: non-stationarity test using the ADF test and co-integration analysis. 
4.2.1.1 Stationarity Tests of the Data  
The first step in co-integration analysis involves the test for non-stationarity of the series using 
Augmented Dickey Fuller Test (ADF) (Vinuya, 2007; Uchezuba, 2005 and Niemi, 2003). Most 
economic time series data tend to exhibit non-stationary processes which imply existence of unit 
roots  (Dawson  and  Dey  2002)  that  is,  the  mean  is  not  constant  and  the  variance  is  time 
dependent (Enders, 1995).  
 
When  a  time  series  is  non-stationary,  regression  in  levels  often  display  first-order  serial 
correlation and this implies spurious or dubious regression results (Vinuya, 2007 and Niami, 
2003). A time series is said to be stationary if its mean fluctuates around a constant long-run   33 
mean and the variance is finite. The ADF test which also tests for economic order of integration 
is therefore performed by running the regression model specified as (Gujarati, 1995): 
t t t P P       1                                                                                   (1) 
Where  Pt is the rice price at time t,  
Pt-1 is the lagged rice price 
δ is a constant drift,  
ρ is the coefficient of lagged rice prices and  
ε is error term.  
Subtracting Pt-1 from both sides of equation (1) gives: 
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Where ∆Pt is the price difference (Pt - Pt-1), and ʱ is equal to (ρ-1) 
 
The ADF Test can also be used for testing a unit root in the presence of a drift and/or trend 
Vinuya (2007). According to Ghosh (2003) the test is based on the statistics obtained from 
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1                                                 (3) 
Where: T   = time trend       
Pit  = Rice price in market i at time t 
Δ  = (I – L) and L is a lag operator  
β & φ  = n x n matrices of coefficients  
ʱ & δ   = vectors of constants and trend coefficients  
k   = lag length    34 
The regression can be run with or without a time trend (T) depending on the nature of the price 
series (Dawson and Dey, 2002). Trend term is only included to make sure that the apparent lack 
of stationarity is not due to the presence of a deterministic trend (Bopape, 2002). k represents the 
number of lags of the price variable included and εt contains no autocorrelation. The lag length 
(k) in this study is determined using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
 
The null hypothesis is that the particular price series is nonstationary (i.e. H0 : δ=β=0). Failure to 
reject the null hypothesis, it is assumed that there is a unit root and hence the data has to be 
differenced before running a regression to come up with white noise series. If the null is rejected 
the data are stationary and can be used without differencing. The procedure is repeated for the 
first differences of the price series. Once the price series are confirmed to be integrated of degree 
one with the rejection of the null hypothesis on the first differences, the series  are deemed 
possible candidates for co-integration (Vinuya, 2007). The number of times needed to difference 
each price series to turn it stationary gives the order of integration of the series. For instance, if a 
price series is differenced once to turn it stationary, this series is integrated of order one and is 
symbolized as I(1) (Uchezuba, 2005 and Niemi, 2003). 
4.2.2  Co-Integration Analysis  
Co-integration  focuses  on  the  long-run  relationships  between  bivariate  or  multivariate  price 
series. Thus, co-integration among non-stationary prices means that a linear combination of the 
series  is  stationary  and  prices  therefore  tend  to  move  towards  the  long-run  equilibrium 
relationship. If Pit denotes the price at market i at time t, and Pjt denote the price in market j at 
time  t,  the  coefficient  β1  in  the  regression  model  (4)  below  gives  the  long-run  relationship 
between these two markets only if the error term (εt) in the same regression model is stationary.  
   35 
This can be done by applying OLS regression on one of the price series, say Pit on Pjt plus a 
constant. This can be represented as follows: 
t jt it P P       1 0                 (4) 
 
This tests whether in equation (4) (β=1) is the test of the Law of One Price. It implies that price 
changes  in  one  market  will  be  transmitted  on  a  one-on-one  basis  to  other  markets 
instantaneously. New developments in time-series econometrics, suggest that if the price series 
are non-stationary, normal inference is not valid on the parameters and results from equation (4) 
are spurious. However, if the price series are integrated of the same order, then equation (4) can 
be used to test for co-integration using the Johansen vector autoregression (VAR) method. 
 
Co-integration  implies  that  there  is  a  linear  long-run  relationship  between  price  series  in 
spatially separated markets, and is interpreted as a test that (β≠0). If (β≠0), then the price series 
are co-integrated and a long-run equilibrium relationship exists between the prices, and hence 
there exist a co-integration vector (1, -β). Co-integration tests for market integration are only 
tests of whether there is a statistically linear relationship between different data series (Asche et. 
al., 1999) and tests for more general notion of equilibrium.  
4.2.3  Johansen's Trace Tests for Co-integrating Vectors 
The Johansen VAR-based procedure (Johansen, 1988) of testing co-integration is the maximum 
likelihood  procedure  which  relies  on  the  relationship  between  the  rank  of  a  matrix  and  its 
characteristic roots. The Johansen (Trace) test detects the number of co-integration vectors that 
exist between two or more integrated time series. The Johansen procedure can be used to test for 
the presence of a co-integration vector between different price series if they are integrated of the 
same order. It is based on maximum likelihood estimation of the error correction model and 
each  two-variable  system  is  modeled  as  a  vector  auto  regression  (STATACORP,  2005  and 










1                                                                         (5) 
Where Pt is an n × 1 vector containing the series of interest (spatial prices), β and φ are n x n 
matrices of coefficients; Δ = (I – L) and L is a lag operator; k is lag length; ʱ and δ are vectors of 
constants and trend coefficients respectively. εt is an identically and independently distributed n-
dimensional vector of residuals with zero mean and variance matrix, Ωε. Since Pt-1 is I (1), but 
ΔPt and ΔPt-i variables are I (0), equation (5) will be balanced if βPt-i is I(0), i.e.  ) 0 ( ~ 1 I P t  . 
The β matrix is the one to convey information about the long-run relationship among variables 
in Pt (Ghosh, 2003).  
 
As such Rashid  (2004)  noted that, the hypothesis  of co-integration will be formulated as  a 
reduced rank of β written as    : ) (r H , where r is the rank of β that determines how many 
linear combinations of Pt are stationary,  χ and π are n x r matrices of full rank. If r = n, then the 
variables are stationary in levels but if r = 0, then no linear combination of Pt is stationary. Two 
methods  for testing  reduced rank of  β as reported by Uchezuba (2005), Rashid (2004) and 
Ghosh,  (2003)  are  maximum  eigenvalue  test,  known  as  λmax  test,  and  trace  test.  The  null 
hypothesis is that there is r co-integrating vectors and is presented as: 
 
  H0: λi = 0        i = r + 1 …, n                                                            (6) 
 
where λi is a measure of the strength of correlation between the co-integrating relations 
for i =1…r.  
 
The maximal-eigenvalue (λ – max) statistics test the null hypothesis of at most r co-integrating 
vectors against the alternative of r+1 and is given by: 
) 1 log( 1
~
max     r T          r = 0, 1, 2, …, n – 1                                (7)   37 
where T is the sample size, and  ) 1 ( 1
~
  r  is the max-eigenvalue estimate. 
The trace statistic test the null hypothesis of r co-integrating vectors against a general alternative 
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4.2.4  Granger Causality Tests 
In order to assess the nature of rice price transmission across markets and causal relationships 
among  spatially  separated  markets,  the  Granger  causality  test  is  used.  Basically,  Granger 
Causality Test is another approach to test market integration. A time series of prices Pit (rice 
price in market i at time t) is said to “Granger cause” another time series of price Pjt (rice price 
in market in j at time t) if current and lagged values of Pit improve prediction of Pjt (Gujarati, 
1995). In other words, causality is basically a measure of the predictability of prices, that is, 
price movements in one market can be used to forecast price changes in other markets (Minten 
and Mendonza, 1998). The existence of co-integration among a set of variables implies Granger 
causality (Rashid, 2004), which, according to Dawson and Dey (2002), follows the Granger-
causality approach and can be tested within Johansen‟s co-integration framework by standard 
Wald tests (Rashid, 2004). For a pair-wise causal relationship, this is determined by re-writing 
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where subscripts denote markets and all other notations remains the same as in (5). 
Causation can occur in two ways, unidirectional– where shocks in one market affect another 
market  but  not  the  reverse  –  and  bidirectional  where  shocks  in  one  individual  market  are 
transmitted both ways. Therefore, based on models 9, four hypotheses of causality can be tested:   38 
1.  Unidirectional causality from Pit to Pjt if the coefficients βj,h are statistically different 
from zero (βj,t ≠ 0) and the coefficients βi,t are not statistically different from zero (βi,t=0) 
2.  Unidirectional causality from Pjt to Pit if coefficients βj,h are not statistically different 
from zero and the coefficients βi,t are statistically different from zero 
3.  Bilateral causality (both Pit and Pjt cause each other) if all coefficients ʱi,
 δi, βi,t and βjt are 
statistically different from zero. 
4.  Independent causality (both Pit and Pjt do not cause each other) if all coefficients ʱi,
 δi, βi,t 
and βj,t are not statistically different from zero. 
4.2.5  Dynamic Interrelationships among Prices at Different Markets 
4.2.5.1 Short-Run Price Relationship between the Markets 
Co-integration  analysis  is  very  important  in  understanding  if  a  long-run  relationship  exists 
between two markets. However, the analysis does not answer two important questions. First, if 
there is a shock in one market, how much of that shock will be transmitted to the other market? 
Second, how long does it take for a price shock in one market to be transmitted to another 
market (Abdula, 2005)?  The magnitude of the  influence between markets  and the speed of 
adjustment  to  shocks  can  be  measured  to  determine  strength  (or  weakness)  of  the  market 
linkage, and rapidity (or sluggishness) by which markets responds and adjust to shocks. The 
short-run dynamics of the price series  can be investigated by estimating the following error 
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where Sk are seasonal dummies (quarterly), Pit is the price of rice in a dependent market i, Pjt is 
the price of rice in independent markets j, ECTt-1 is the lagged error correction term, εt is the   39 
error  term.  The  most  relevant  parameters  according  to  Chirwa  (2001)  are  the  short-run 
parameter (φ) and the adjustment parameter (θ). The significance of the short-run parameters 
and the adjustment parameter has implications for causality and co-integration (Enders, 1995). If 
θ is zero, then the change in price in market i does not respond to the deviation from the long-
run equilibrium in (t-1). If the adjustment parameter is zero and all φl are zero, then the price in 
market j does not Granger cause price in market i. In addition, the price series are co-integrated 
if one or both of the coefficients are significantly different from zero. 
4.2.5.2 Nonlinear Impulse Response Functions  
A  concept  of  impulse  response  function  gives  additional  information  about  the  long-run 
dynamic interrelationships among prices. The study used nonlinear impulse response functions 
to analyse the dynamic paths of adjustment to localized exogenous shocks in the Malawian rice 
markets for the pre- and post-MACE periods.  In the impulse response functions analysis it is 
necessary to note the nonstationarity of price data as well as the error correction properties. Due 
to these factors, shocks may elicit responses that are temporary, such that there is a return to the 
initial  time  path  of  the  variables,  or  permanent,  causing  a  persistent  shift  in  the  time  path 
(Goodwin and Piggott, 2001).  
 
The  study  adopted  the  non-linear  response  function  following  Potter  (1995)  which  defines 
responses denoted as It+k  basing on observed data (zt, zt-1, …), a shock, v and E[.] as the 
expectation operator in the following equation: 
...] | [ ...] , | [ ...) , , ( , 1 1 , , 1 1 , 1                t t t t k t t t t t k t t t k t z Z z Z Z E z Z v z Z Z E Z Z v I      (11)  
This was done by adjusting the last observation in the time series for the Lilongwe market by 
one-half  standard  deviation  to  represent  positive  and  negative  shocks  and  the  impulse  was 
produced by estimating E[.].    40 
CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The  concept  of  market  integration  is  modelled  within  the  framework  of  the  spatial  price 
equilibrium model of inter-market linkages, in the point-space tradition of Samuelson (1952) 
and Takayama and Judge (1964). This theory is subject to production shocks and general price 
information. Two markets are said to be spatially integrated if, when trade takes place between 
them, price spreads between them are less than or equal to transaction costs. This implies that 
markets must be linked by efficient arbitrage conditions (Chirwa, 1999). If markets are co-
integrated there is evidence that the markets have a long-run relationship and that their prices in 
the long-run will not diverge from each other (Uchezuba, 2005). This notion is presented in this 
chapter which has utilized both bivariate and multivariate error collection models.  
5.1 Characterising Rice Markets in Malawi  
5.1.1  Rice Production in Malawi 
The theory of market integration is highly influenced by production trends of the commodity 
under study (Abdula, 2005). As such it is essential to characterise rice markets in Malawi based 
on rice production trends.  In Malawi all rice is grown by smallholder farmers, either under 
irrigation or rain-fed in upland areas. It is the second most important food crop after maize 
(RATES,  2003).  Unlike  maize,  rice  production  is  concentrated  in  specific  areas  which  are 
mainly  along  the  lakeshore  due  to  the  fact  that  rice  requires  significant  amounts  of  water 
(USAID,  2008).  Figure  2  shows  production  trends  of  smallholder  agriculture  in  Malawi  by 
Agricultural Development Division (ADD). As shown in figure 2, Machinga ADD is the largest 
rice producer followed by Salima ADD while Kasungu and Mzuzu are the least rice producing 
areas.    41 
The figure also portrays fluctuations in production across ADDs and according to Ng‟ong‟ola et. 
al., (2003) these fluctuations are attributed to erratic rainfall, drought and changes in commodity 
marketing. With reference to the markets in this study it is shown that in the northern region 
Karonga and Chitipa markets which falls under Karonga ADD are the surplus markets unlike 
Mzuzu market which is under Mzuzu ADD. In central region Salima market falls under Salima 
ADD where as Lilongwe and Chimbiya falls under Lilongwe ADD. In southern region Ntaja 
market falls under Machinga ADD which reports highest rice production, Lunzu falls under 
Blantyre ADD while Bangula falls under Shire Valley ADD. This then implies that Mzuzu, 
Lilongwe, Chimbiya and Lunzu markets are the major deficit markets while the rest are the 
surplus markets.  






































5.1.2  Price Variability  
Prices for agricultural products in different markets are largely influenced by seasonality in 
production, fluctuations in production and the general economic growth of the country. As such 
price variability becomes a common phenomenon in agricultural outputs due to stochastic nature 
of the products. The stochastic nature of agricultural outputs is heavily linked to natural factors   42 
such as weather and economic factors such as structural transformation in markets, length of 
different marketing channels, transport and other marketing infrastructure. Demand factors such 
as consumer habits, substitution between products and per capita income also influence prices. 
The consumers and other market participants can be affected by a host of daily events such as 
shocks  that  affect  their  behaviour  and  their  response  to  prices.  In  turn  their  reactions  have 
repercussions on other agents and the ensuing dynamic process leads to determination of prices 
at each point in time. As such it is of particular importance to understand the variability in prices 
over time and space in order to give an insight of price behaviour within the period of study. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and coefficient of variation of the prices of the markets. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Nominal Rice Prices in Malawi Kwacha for the Period 
1994 to 2007 






Chitipa  168  4.98  159.47  43.32  32.88  2.54  75.89 
Karonga  168  3.35  144.53  40.68  33.11  2.55  81.39 
Mzuzu  168  4.14  139.00  47.98  31.69  2.44  66.04 
Salima  168  4.34  115.00  42.55  30.45  2.35  71.57 
Lilongwe  168  5.63  128.00  49.53  33.00  2.55  66.62 
Chimbiya  168  3.82  152.38  45.86  34.78  2.68  75.83 
Ntaja  168  3.05  120.00  36.21  25.59  1.97  70.67 
Lunzu  168  4.50  120.27  42.06  28.04  2.16  66.66 
Bangula  168  3.67  123.33  40.89  30.94  2.39  75.67 
Source: Survey Data 
 
As reported in Table 1, the highest nominal price of rice across markets was observed in Chitipa 
with a maximum of Mk159.47 and Ntaja reported a minimum nominal price of Mk3.05. On 
average  Lilongwe  and  Mzuzu  reported  the  highest  mean  prices  of  Mk49.53  and  Mk47.98 
respectively. Lilongwe and Mzuzu are the two major urban centres in Malawi in addition to 
Blantyre. The study however, dropped Blantyre market due to data inconsistency. However, the 
inclusion of Lunzu which is one of the major markets in the city of Blantyre shows a highest 
mean price of all the southern region markets (Ntaja, Lunzu and Bangula).    43 
Lilongwe,  Mzuzu  and  Blantyre  are  major  demand  centres  for  rice  and  hence  higher  prices 
(Chirwa,  1999).  The  lowest  mean  nominal  rice  prices  are  reported  in  Ntaja,  Bangula,  and 
Karonga. These areas were observed by Chirwa (2001) as main rice producing areas in Malawi. 
The rice prices show high variability across markets. As shown in table 1 the highest variability 
is  observed  at  Karonga  with  a  coefficient  of  variation  of  81.39%  and  lowest  variability  of 
66.04% is observed at Mzuzu market. This then implies that the rice prices have been more 
variable over the years. This phenomenon can be attributed to fluctuations in rice production and 
more importantly due to inflation.   
5.1.3  Seasonality and Trend 
Agricultural commodity prices vary annually and portray trends and cycles or seasonal patterns. 
This  behaviour in  time series  data can be depicted graphically as  suggested by Tomek and 
Robinson (1990). In this study figures; 3, 4 and 5 are a graphical representations showing these 
annual variations in nominal rice prices in the markets under study for the Northern, Central and 
Southern regions respectively. 
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All the three figures show that on average the rice prices move in the same direction (co-move) 
for the period understudy. As can be seen from figure 3, 4 and 5 prices were very high in 2006 
in all the markets. Mzuzu reports highest price in the northern region, Lilongwe in the central 
region and Lunzu from the southern region. Overall, southern region reported the lowest price 
while central region has the highest mean price. This could be  explained due to the fact that 
southern region is the main producing area of rice unlike the central region.   45 
5.1.4  Seasonal Variation 
A further analysis of variability of monthly rice prices for each month of the year was carried 
out  in  order  to  arrive  at  the  seasonality  of  price  variability.  Seasonal  variation  occurs  in 
agricultural products such as rice over a production cycle which is normally within a period of 
twelve months. Crop prices tend to follow a general seasonal pattern, which is a function of 
relative changes in supply and demand as the marketing year progresses. Generally crop prices 
set their seasonal low at harvest followed by a post harvest rally. Post-harvest rallies occur 
because the supply of the crop is fixed and consumption gradually uses up that supply, causing 
prices to rise. A variability analysis on rice prices therefore helps to arrive at a seasonal index of 
price variability. Figure 6 is a graphical presentation of seasonal indices over the twelve months 
period of the year.  
















Figure 6 depicts the seasonal pattern of rice prices across the country. Typical of agricultural 
commodities, the lowest prices are reported between June and July, which happens to be rice 
harvesting period. These prices start increasing from August and reach its peak in December. 
Overall the prices are high until May and this could be as a result of scarcity of the crop as this is 
the growing season in most parts of the country.   46 
5.1.5  Trend Analysis 
Trend Analysis in time series data captures gradual, long-term changes in crop markets that can 
have  powerful  influence  on  markets  which  may  significantly  alter  seasonal  patterns.  This 
analysis as suggested by Goodwin (1994), Goez and Weber (1986) involves calculation of trend 
factor by performing an OLS of the time series on a time dummy variable, which increases by 1 
each consecutive time period (month). The time variable is taken as an independent variable 
used as a surrogate for other variables, which may change by the same amount each period, or 
for variables such as technological change that may readily be subject to measurement. The 
regression results of price series on time variable are presented in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Results of Regressing Price Series on Trend Variable 
MARKET  Real Price Trend 
Coefficient 
t-statistic of linear 
trend 
R-squared of the Trend 
Equation 
Chitipa  0.0400  3.18  0.0575 
Karonga  0.0850  6.53  0.2046 
Mzuzu  0.0282  2.47  0.0355 
Salima  0.0385  4.03  0.0893 
Lilongwe  0.0214  1.44  0.0124 
Chimbiya  0.1104  8.89  0.3223 
Ntaja  0.0451  4.75  0.1195 
Lunzu  -0.0210  -1.66  0.0980 
Bangula  0.0487  4.13  0.0931 
Source: Survey Data 
 
This analysis determines the influence of time trend on the price levels. Goodwin (1994) noted 
that a trend is of enough significance if the trend analysis suggests that time alone explains as 
much as 15 percent of the variation in the price series and that probably should not be ignored. 
The results in Table 2 above show that all trend coefficients are positive except for Lunzu. This 
implies that the prices have been increasing throughout the study period. However, it is only in 
two markets; Karonga and Chimbiya where trend explains 15% or more of the variations. The 
rest of the markets their R-squared are less than 15%. This implies that the time trend has less   47 
influence in most of the price levels in these markets such that inclusion or exclusion of the 
trend can not change the outcome of the results. 
5.2 Determining the Extent of Spatial Market integration  
5.2.1  Stationarity Test 
The  price  series  from  the  nine  selected  markets  under  study  were  tested  individually  for 
stationarity,  thus,  the  price  series  were  tested  for  presence  of  unit  roots.  The  study  applied 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test to carry out this test. The Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) was used to determine the lag length. The resulting residuals follow white noise process. 
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Table 3: Stationarity Test Results Using ADF Test for Unit Roots 
  LEVELS  FIRST DIFFERENCE  CRITICAL 
VALUES 
FULL SAMPLE (1994:O1 - 2007:12) 










1%  5% 
Chitipa  -0.017  -3.130  10  0.585  -6.178  9  I(1)  -4.021  -3.442 
Karonga  -0.017  -2.579  11  -0.038  -5.011  10  I(1)  -4.021  -3.442 
Mzuzu  -0.024  -3.447  10  -3.462  -7.430  9  I(1)  -4.021  -3.442 
Salima  -0.024  -3.735  9  -  -  -  I(0)  -4.022  -3.443 
Lilongwe  -0.021  -2.298  2  -4.410  -10.212  1  I(1)  -4.018  -3.441 
Chimbiya  -0.027  -2.622  5  -10.340  -9.362  2  I(1)  -4.019  -3.442 
Ntaja  -0.025  -3.158  1  -3.832  -13.909  3  I(1)  -4.019  -3.441 
Lunzu  -0.024  -2.663  2  -1.187  -9.751  1  I(1)  -4.018  -3.441 
Bangula  -0.011  -3.747  1  -  -  -  I(0)  -4.021  -3.443 
PRE-MACE (1994:01 - 2004:08) 
Chitipa  -0.033  -3.847  2  -  -  -  I(0)  -4.031  -3.447 
Karonga  -0.042  -2.063  1  -0.912  -6.620  9  I(1)  -4.034  -3.448 
Mzuzu  -0.028  -3.159  10  -0.883  -5.436  9  I(1)  -4.034  -3.448 
Salima  -0.037  -3.332  9  -1.301  -5.854  12  I(1)  -4.035  -3.448 
Lilongwe  -0.028  -2.012  2  -1.197  -9.064  1  I(1)  -4.033  -3.447 
Chimbiya  -0.035  -3.319  3  -1.355  -8.085  2  I(1)  -4.034  -3.448 
Ntaja  -0.033  -3.146  1  -1.123  -8.127  1  I(1)  -4.033  -3.447 
Lunzu  -0.036  -2.193  2  -1.246  -9.406  1  I(1)  -4.032  -3.447 
Bangula  -0.033  -3.274  1  -1.103  -12.404  0  I(1)  -4.031  -3.447 
POST-MACE (2004:09 - 2007:12) 
Chitipa  -0.115  -3.921  3  -  -  -  I(0)  -4.260  -3.556 
Karonga  -0.208  -3.011  0  -0.993  -5.952  0  I(1)  -4.279  -3.556 
Mzuzu  -0.360  -2.749  2  -1.123  -6.657  0  I(1)  -4.260  -3.548 
Salima  -0.226  0.797  1  -0.649  -5.472  11  I(1)  -4.362  -3.592 
Lilongwe  -0.122  -1.821  1  -0.904  -5.370  0  I(1)  -4.260  -3.548 
Chimbiya  -0.209  -2.286  2  -0.835  -4.439  2  I(1)  -4.279  -3.556 
Ntaja  -0.182  -2.401  2  -0.820  -4.861  0  I(1)  -4.260  -3.548 
Lunzu  -0.163  -2.051  4  -0.734  -4.759  2  I(1)  -4.279  -3.556 
Bangula  -0.188  -2.039  6  -0.854  -4.965  0  I(1)  -4.260  -3.548 
Notes:   All variables are in natural logarithm. The ADF tests H0:: Pi ~ I (1) against H0:  Pi ~ I (0).  
 
The results, presented in Table 3, indicate that for full sample database all price series are I (1) 
(i.e.  integrated  of  order  1),  except  for  Salima  and  Bangula  which  are  stationary  in  levels. 
However, for the periods; Pre and Post-MACE, Chitipa price series are I (0) (i.e., stationary in 
levels) while the rest of the markets are I(1). This implies that Salima and Bangula for full 
sample and Chitipa for the two periods did not share the common trend with dominant central 
markets, such as Lilongwe and Mzuzu in their respective periods. Therefore these markets were   49 
excluded from co-integration and causality analyses, as inclusion of them would increase the 
number of co-integrating vectors (Rashid, 2004). 
5.2.2  Co-integration Test  
Co-integration tests in this study are based on Johansen‟s method and the results presented are 
for both Bivariate and Multivariate models. Co-integration is based on the notion that if the log 
likelihood  of  unconstrained  model  that  includes  the  co-integrating  equations  is  significantly 
different from the log likelihood of constrained model that does not include the co-integrating 
equations,  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  co-integration  is  rejected  (STATACORP,  2005).  Co-
integration test results are presented in Tables 4, 5 and 6. The co-integration results presented in 
Table 4 are for bivariate models and highlight that most of the markets under study have a stable 
long-term relations over the period of analysis, from 1994 to 2007 for full sample. However, co-
integration analysis does not allow  us to say anything definite about the strength of market 
integration (Goletti and Babu, 1994) but rather it helps to reveal how price relations among 
markets  change  over  time.  An  example  is  to  understand  how  MACE  has  affected  market 
integration.  
 
To study this problem the sample was divided into two sub-samples, the first Pre-MACE and the 
second Post-MACE. The study shows that the number of cointegrated markets during the Pre-
MACE period is much smaller than that of the Post-MACE period. That suggests that MACE 
improved the transmission of price signals among various regions of the country, strengthening 
the links between price series. For example, results show that in the Pre-MACE period, out of 
the 56 market links presented 33 of them were significant, representing 58.93%. On the other 
hand 73.21% of market links were significant during the Post-MACE period. This difference in 
proportion of integrated markets between the two periods is statistically significant at 1% level 
(p-value = 0.0006, see Appendix 3).   50 
Table 4: Co-integration Test Results (Bivariate Analysis) 
Market(i,j)  Chitipa  Karonga  Mzuzu  Salima  Lilongwe  Chimbiya  Ntaja  Lunzu  Bangula 
FULL SAMPLE (1994: 01 - 2007:12) 
Chitipa  0.000  16.711*  22.412**    15.870*  20.388*  15.034  15.124  - 
Karonga  27.617*  0.000  26.258*  -  25.331**  40.388*  27.617*  15.769*  - 
Mzuzu  38.028*  42.934*  0.000  -  23.444*  31.298*  36.311*  18.230*  - 
Salima  -  -  -  0.000  -  -  -  -  - 
Lilongwe  24.997*  25.920*  25.546*  -  0.000  22.207**  30.737**  19.545**  - 
Chimbiya  12.325  21.448*  21.121*  -  35.258**  0.000  25.231**  14.235  - 
Ntaja  15.325  18.771*  24.356*  -  15.687*  34.538**  0.000  23.214*  - 
Lunzu  12.721  29.376*  13.486  -  14.365  18.098*  40.091*  0.000  - 
Bangula  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
                   
PRE-MACE (1994:01 - 2004:08) 
Chitipa  0.000  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Karonga  -  0.000  10.154  14.523*  09.032  39.872*  17.880*  14.325  14.012 
Mzuzu  -  41.588*  0.000  26.351*  23.452*  36.475*  31.309*  18.642*  17.085* 
Salima  -  13.52  23.124*  0.000  25.321**  38.553*  41.169**  15.354  11.516 
Lilongwe  -  22.245*  18.110*  16.048*  0.000  16.051*  26.448**  10.993  14.900 
Chimbiya      -  08.961  08.654  09.852  25.124**  0.000  14.234  14.572  20.541* 
Ntaja  -  15.234  14.289  28.578*  24.239**  25.752*  0.000  23.785*  22.139** 
Lunzu  -  15.395  12.965  19.871*  14.234  14.903  31.638**  0.000  17.675* 
Bangula  -  13.875  09.685  10.568  15.586*  24.759*  37.582**  23.254**  0.000 
                   
POST-MACE (2004:09 - 2007:12) 
Chitipa  0.000  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Karonga  -  0.000  28.694**  12.337  25.876*  21.445*  13.998  17.475*  15.206 
Mzuzu  -  19.003*  0.000  18.240*  39.542**  19.675*  18.040*  15.825*  17.585* 
Salima  -  12.853  25.42*  0.000  23.421*  15.712*  17.584*  17.523*  16.722* 
Lilongwe  -  17.082*  16.809*  23.666*  0.000  20.735*  15.968*  13.514  31.561* 
Chimbiya      -  15.089  15.958*  18.754*  19.524*  0.000  28.245*  12.542  11.654 
Ntaja  -  14.587  17.582*  19.752*  25.475*  15.536*  0.000  27.562*  15.577* 
Lunzu  -  23.435*  13.296  20.574*  15.812*  21.585*  17.244*  0.000  21.474* 
Bangula  -  12.322  09.254  23.123*  12.542  14.582  15.289  23.241*  0.000 
The critical values for rejection of a null hypothesis of no co-integration are 20.04 and 15.54 for P ≤ 0.01 and P ≤ 
0.05 respectively. An integrated link is the one whose Trace statistic is above the critical value. 
*, ** Significant at 5% and at 1% level of significance respectively 
-Salima and Bangula are I(0) for full sample and Chitipa is also I(0) for Pre and Post-MACE samples. See table 5 
 
 
These results confirm the hypothesis that MACE intervention through the market information 
system played a critical role in market functioning. This is in agreement with Mabota et. al. 
(2003) who observed that agricultural market information is important for economic efficiency, 
performance,  and  equity.  According  to  KACE  (2004)  the  provision  of  market  information 
enables smallholder resource-poor farmers to access better markets and better prices for their 
produce. In addition this enlightens them to better market opportunities that exist elsewhere in   51 
liberalized markets. As such the services of MACE could be improving market performance in 
Malawi through increasing of knowledge of buyers and sellers about quantities available for 
sales and purchase and other factors that affect commodity prices.  
 
Mabota  et.  al.,  (2003)  also  observed  that  in  Mozambique  public  information  about  new 
opportunities helped to provide incentives to greater participation in the market.  There was a 
significant  relationship  between  households  with  information  and  their  participation  in  the 
market. In regions where people had access to market information, they also participated more 
in the marketing of cereals, beans and peanuts. In addition, there was complementarity between 
access  to  information  and  access  to  extension  services;  that  is,  those  who  benefited  from 
extension services had also an access to information. In Mali Mabota et. al., (2003) also noted 
that the right information helped to shift surpluses to areas with shortages without resorting to 
foreign aid. This has led Mali to self-sufficiency for basic grain need.  
 
However, the improvement observed in this study can not be attributed to MACE intervention 
alone as market integration is a function of so many factors. For example, Goletti et.al., (1995) 
observed that marketing infrastructure (e.g. roads and communication), volatility of government 
intervention,  and  the  degree  of  self-sufficiency  in  production  are  the  major  determinants  of 
market  integration.  This  study  only  focused  on  MACE  as  a  market-enhancing  intervention. 
MACE project as per its objectives is trying to improve market information system through 
collection and transmission of price information (IDEAA, 2004). It is however, interesting to 
note  that  other  market  information  such  as  transaction  costs  and  trade  flows  are  not  well 
disseminated by the project. This study therefore, calls for MACE implementers to consider 
collecting  and  disseminating  such  important  and  valuable  market  information.  In  addition 
further studies on the subject matter should consider such factors affecting market integration.   52 
The importance of other factors significantly impacting spatial market integration  is equally 
manifested by the fact that some links show no co-integration despite the prospects of improved 
market integration over time after the introduction of MACE project into the market system. The 
results show that most links involving Bangula are not well integrated. This could be attributed 
to lack of proper infrastructures such as roads in the area. Bangula market is situated in Nsanje 
district of which there have been no good roads for many years. The absence of proper and well 
functioning infrastructure such as roads means that it is difficult to transfer the commodity from 
surplus regions to deficit areas.  This also masks the presence of high transaction costs which is 
a key factor in efficient arbitrage conditions (Uchezuba, 2005).  
5.2.3  Co-integration Test (Multivariate Analysis) 
Another approach to testing spatial marketing integration utilised the multivariate co-integration 
technique and results are presented in Table 5. The trace test results reveal the existence of four, 
five and six co-integrating vectors for full sample, Pre-MACE and Post-MACE price series, 
respectively. The results show that the markets for rice in Malawi have been operating as a 
unified  market  system  over  the  period  of  study.  In  terms  of  the  number  of  significant  co-
integrating vectors, the extent of market integration is higher for Post-MACE price series. These 
results are consistent with Chirwa (1999) who observed that maize and rice markets in Malawi 
operate as a unified market system. Chirwa (2001) also had similar findings on food market 
integration. It was observed that food market integration in Malawi had been improving over 
time due to market liberalization policies that were introduced in 1987 (Goletti and Babu, 1994). 
This therefore implies that introduction of market-enhancing interventions and policies such as 
market liberalization and Market Information System has the capacity to significantly improve 
market performance in Malawi. 
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Table 5: Co-integration Test (Multivariate Analysis) 
Trace Test 
Ho: rank=r 














Trace Statistic  Critical Values 
(5%) 
r = 0  183.392  124.240  324.788  156.000  316.451  156.000 
r ≤ 1  116.348  94.150  221.917  124.240  224.471  124.240 
r ≤ 2  76.790  68.520  159.860  94.150  157.325  94.150 
r ≤ 3  48.089  47.210  101.610  68.520  98.886  68.520 
r ≤ 4  25.578  29.680  60.172  47.210  60.931  47.210 
r ≤ 5  10.246  15.410  29.326  29.680  32.797  29.680 
r ≤ 6  3.317  3.760  14.789  15.410  15.240  15.410 
r ≤ 7      2.715  3.760  3.416  3.760 
 
5.2.4  Johansen's Trace Tests for Co-integrating Vectors 
A further test on the extent of rice market integration was done through a sequential search for 
n−1  co-integrating  vectors.  The  Johansen‟s  λTrace  test  results  for  this  sequential  search  are 
presented in Table 6. The results indicate that full sample had a maximum of four co-integrating 
vectors,  Pre-MACE  had  four  while  Post-MACE  reported  a  maximum  of  six  co-integrating 
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Table 6: Johansen’s Likelihood Ratio Test for the Number of Co- Integrating Vectors 




    FULL SAMPLE (1994:01 - 2007:12)       
Lilongwe + Mzuzu              0  25.546  15.41 
                1  3.609  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Lunzu            1  19.265  20.04 
                2  4.138  6.65 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Karonga            1  30.308  15.41 
                2  3.360  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Karonga + Ntaja          2  30.899  20.04 
                3  3.986  6.65 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Karonga + Ntaja + Chimbiya      3  27.117  20.04 
                4  4.192  6.65 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Karonga + Ntaja + Chimbiya + Chitipa    4  24.906  15.41 
    PRE-MACE (1994:01 - 2004:08)       
Lilongwe + Mzuzu              0  18.110  15.41 
                1  3.218  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Lunzu            1  10.285  15.41 
                2  2.293  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Karonga            1  23.168  15.41 
                2  3.327  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Karonga + Ntaja          2  23.490  15.41 
                3  3.593  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Karonga + Ntaja + Chimbiya      3  20.036  15.41 
                4  3.372  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Karonga + Ntaja + Chimbiya + Salima     4  20.215  15.41 
                5  3.403  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Karonga + Ntaja + Chimbiya + Salima + Bangula  5  15.216  15.41 
    POST-MACE (2004:09 - 2007:12)       
Lilongwe + Mzuzu              0  16.809  15.41 
                1  3.131  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Lunzu            1  21.474  15.41 
                2  3.217  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Lunzu + Karonga        2  23.642  15.41 
                3  4.681  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Lunzu + Karonga + Ntaja        3  23.389  15.41 
                4  4.530  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Lunzu + Karonga + Ntaja + Chimbiya    4  19.060  15.41 
                5  3.863  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Lunzu + Karonga + Ntaja + Chimbiya + Salima  5  19.605  15.41 
                6  0.498  3.76 
Lilongwe + Mzuzu + Lunzu + Karonga + Ntaja + Chimbiya + Salima + Bangula  6  15.740  15.41 
                7  3.416  3.76 
Notes:   The critical values for rejection of a null hypothesis of n-2 are 20.04 and 15.54 for P ≤ 0.01 and P ≤ 0.05 
respectively. 
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Applying the same sequential methodology on Post-MACE data set, the results suggest that the 
extent  of  spatial  rice  market  integration  in  Malawi  has  substantially  improved.  All  markets 
including Lunzu and Bangula, except Chitipa which was tested stationary in levels are found to 
have shared a common trend during this period. These results are consistent with Rashid (2004) 
in Ugandan maize markets where it was observed that some markets which did not share a 
common trend with major markets like Kampala improved with market liberalisation policies. 
 
A significant implication of co-integration approach is that, while individual price series may 
wander extensively, certain pairs should not diverge from one another in the long-run. Another 
implication of co-integration and representation is  that co-integration between two variables 
implies existence of causality between them in at least one direction (Gujarati, 1995). As such 
co-integration itself cannot be used to make inferences about the direction of causation between 
the variables and the causality tests are therefore necessary. 
5.3 Determining the Causality Relationships among Spatial Rice Markets 
As  earlier  stated,  to  determine  whether  there  are  any  causal  relationships  in  prices  among 
cointegrated markets, Granger causality test was carried out following regression equation (9). 
Again, like the ADF tests, of importance in the causality test is the specification of lag length in 
the equation. Gujarati (1995) concedes that Granger causality test is very sensitive to the number 
of lags used in the analysis. He suggests that to have confidence in the results of the test, we 
should use more rather than fewer lags. As such the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) was 
also used to determine the appropriate lag length to be included in the regression equations. The 
causality tests are tested by the significance of β1 and β2 as specified in equation (9). Granger 
causality test results are presented in Table 7 and only cover the causality results between the 
major urban markets (Mzuzu, Lilongwe and Lunzu) and the peripheral markets. 
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Table 7: Pair wise Granger Causality Tests by Regional Centres 
Market i  Market j  βi  Pi-value    βj  Pj-value    Direction of 
Causality 
FULL SAMPLE (1994:01-2007:12) 
Lilongwe  Mzuzu  -0.127  0.000    0.102  0.019    Bidirectional 
  Lunzu  -0.090  0.107    0.074  0.029    Unidirectional 
  Chimbiya  -0.127  0.000    0.112  0.032    Bidirectional 
  Ntaja  -0.138  0.000    0.152  0.001    Bidirectional 
  Chitipa  -0.152  0.000    0.091  0.151    Unidirectional 
  Karonga  -0.088  0.390    0.181  0.000    Unidirectional 
Mzuzu  Chitipa  -0.271  0.000    0.084  0.110    Bidirectional 
  Karonga  -0.263  0.000    0.065  0.277    Bidirectional 
  Chimbiya  -0.242  0.000    0.129  0.450    Unidirectional 
  Ntaja  -0.217  0.000    0.131  0.013    Unidirectional 
  Lunzu  -0.127  0.005    0.080  0.290    Unidirectional 
Lunzu  Chitipa  -0.099  0.007    0.066  0.193    Unidirectional 
  Karonga  -0.133  0.000    0.196  0.120    Unidirectional 
  Chimbiya  -0.117  0.022    0.131  0.272    Independent 
  Ntaja  -0.235  0.000    0.142  0.014    Bidirectional 
PRE-MACE (1994:01-2004:08) 
Lilongwe  Mzuzu  -0.143  0.001    0.057  0.198    Unidirectional 
  Lunzu  -0.079  0.094    0.059  0.121    Unidirectional 
  Chimbiya  -0.122  0.004    0.123  0.035    Bidirectional 
  Ntaja  -0.133  0.007    0.189  0.210    Unidirectional 
  Salima  -0.096  -0.296    0.100  0.001    Unidirectional 
  Karonga  -0.096  -0.096    0.194  0.000    Bidirectional 
  Bangula  -0.096  -0.196    0.085  0.181    Independent 
Mzuzu  Karonga  -0.234  0.000    0.282  0.002    Bidirectional 
  Chimbiya  -0.297  0.000    0.268  0.352    Unidirectional 
  Ntaja  -0.204  0.004    0.287  0.000    Unidirectional 
  Lunzu  -0.099  0.351    0.143  0.001    Unidirectional 
  Salima  -0.166  0.164    0.234  0.000    Unidirectional 
  Bangula  -0.064  0.292    0.117  0.010    Unidirectional 
Lunzu  Karonga  -0.163  0.000    0.185  0.320    Unidirectional 
  Chimbiya  -0.143  0.120    0.082  0.328    Independent 
  Ntaja  -0.246  0.000    0.136  0.037    Bidirectional 
  Salima  -0.164  0.010    0.187  0.065    Unidirectional 
  Bangula  -0.073  0.282    0.111  0.106    Independent 
POST-MACE (2004:09-2007:12) 
Lilongwe  Mzuzu  -0.056  0.091    0.304  0.001    Bidirectional 
  Lunzu  -0.183  0.214    10.081  0.235    Independent 
  Chimbiya  -0.146  0.012    0.251  0.075    Bidirectional 
  Ntaja  -0.123  0.003    0.029  0.712    Unidirectional 
  Salima  -0.053  0.029    0.206  0.003    Bidirectional 
  Karonga  -0.231  0.007    0.214  0.327    Unidirectional 
  Bangula  -0.389  0.000    0.047  0.732    Unidirectional 
Mzuzu  Karonga  -0.481  0.000    0.092  0.047    Bidirectional 
  Chimbiya  -0.269  0.013    0.272  0.000    Unidirectional 
  Ntaja  -0.305  0.014    0.211  0.005    Bidirectional 
  Lunzu  -0.299  0.110    0.185  0.003    Unidirectional 
  Salima  -0.508  0.001    0.040  0.667    Unidirectional 
  Bangula  -0.260  0.490    0.201  0.002    Unidirectional 
Lunzu  Karonga  -0.020  0.803    0.339  0.004    Unidirectional 
  Chimbiya  -0.091  0.126    0.431  0.230    Independent 
  Ntaja  -0.196  0.016    0.379  0.018    Bidirectional 
  Salima  -0.018  0.034    0.019  0.014    Unidirectional 
  Bangula  -0.012  0.045    0.098  0.034    Bidirectional   57 
Pre-MACE database, presented in Table 7, suggest that out of 18 market links, the study failed 
to  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  unidirectional  causality  for  11  market  links.  Unidirectional 
causality implies that either coefficient β2 is statistically different from zero (β2 ≠ 0) and the 
coefficients β1 is not statistically different from zero (β1 = 0) or vice-versa. For example, for 
Lilongwe-Mzuzu link, the hypothesis that β2 is not statistically different from zero (β2 = 0) can 
not be rejected at 5% level of significance. This implies that the causality is unidirectional, with 
prices in Mzuzu market Granger causing the prices in Lilongwe market. For Post-MACE period, 
unidirectional causality is found in nine of the 18 links. 
 
Both way causalities are found to exist in four of the 18 market links (i.e. 22.22%) during the 
Pre-MACE  period.  For  example;  Mzuzu-Karonga  and  Lunzu-Ntaja  are  among  the  markets 
which indicate interdependence between them. In other words, price in one market reacts to any 
deviations of price in the other market from its equilibrium path. This bi-directional causality is 
more pronounced in the Post-MACE database where out of 18 market pairs reported in Table 7, 
causal  feedbacks  are  found  to  exist  in  seven  pairs  representing  38.89%.  These  results  also 
indicate increased integration of the markets in the Post-MACE period and the difference in 
percentages of bi-directional causalities between the two periods is significant at 5% level (P = 
0.0147, refer Appendix 1). Independent causality where both Pit and Pjt do not cause each other 
manifest itself in three and two market links during the Pre-MACE and the Post-MACE price 
series, respectively.  
 
It is important to note that although co-integration between two price series implies Granger 
causality in  at  least  one direction, the opposite is  not  necessarily true as  stated by Abdulai 
(2006). In this case, as noted in the earlier discussion about co-integration, lack of co-integration 
between the two trading price series may indicate that market integration is absent, as other 
factors such as transaction costs determine the movements of one of the price series.    58 
However, Granger causality may exist, indicating that, although the two price series drift apart 
due to other factors such as non-stationarity and transaction costs, some price signals are passing 
through from one market to another. On the other hand, lack of Granger causality may not imply 
an absence of transmission, as price signals may be transmitted instantaneously under special 
circumstances, which are expected for a staple food commodity like rice (Abdulai, 2006). 
 
Granger  causality  results  however,  as  noted  by  Rashid  (2004),  point  to  the  limitations  of 
bivariate market integration analyses, where a central location is assumed to be exogenous, i.e., 
to  dominate  the  long-run  price  movements.  The  notion  of  central  market  being  exogenous 
implies that, if Lilongwe for example is indeed such an exogenous location, then all other βi,t's 
would have been statistically zero, which is not the case in this study. As such the study fails to 
identify a central rice market that is exogenous in the rice markets in Malawi. These results 
however,  contradict  the  findings  of  Chirwa  (2001)  who  found  that  Karonga  was  weakly 
exogenous in rice market. Nevertheless, the findings of this study are similar to those of Rashid 
(2004) who also failed to find a central market in the Ugandan maize markets. 
5.4 Determining Dynamic Adjustments to Long-run Equilibrium of Spatial Rice Markets 
5.4.1  Short-Run Price Relationship between the Markets 
The study further modelled the short-run price relationship between the markets under study 
using Lilongwe as an independent market expected to have an influence on other peripheral 
markets. The selection of Lilongwe was done based on the fact that Lilongwe is one of the major 
urban centres in the country and is situated in the centre where its impact is expected to be 
transmitted to all the three regions of Malawi. However, the fact that rice produced mainly from 
Southern and Northern Malawi, the impact of Lilongwe is expected to be minimal. 
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Two lags for the markets in estimating equation (10) were used in the short-run regression as 
determined  by  the  Akaike  Information  Criterion.  The  study  included  quarterly  seasonal 
dummies, with the first quarter (Q1) coinciding with the rice crop growing period, the second 
quarter (Q2) coinciding with the harvesting season, the third quarter (Q3) is the marketing and 
slack season and the fourth quarter (Q4) is the garden preparation season (Chirwa, 2001).  
 
The most important parameters in equation (10) were the coefficient of the contemporaneous 
change (β) in Lilongwe market and the coefficient of the lagged error correction term (θ). The 
error correction term (ECT) is derived from the residual from the co-integration vector of the 
dependent  and  independent  market  in  the  bivariate  analysis.  Based  on  the  results  of  the 
coefficients of the current change in Lilongwe market‟s price (the short-run parameter) and the 
adjustment speed parameter, overall, the general interpretation of the short-run parameters and 
the adjustment parameters revealed that both causality and co-integration have increased over 
time, further confirming the hypotheses of co-integration and market integration.  
 
Table 8: Short-run and Adjustment Speed Coefficients 






Market j*  β  θ  β  θ  β  θ 
Chitipa  0.145  -0.290  -  -  -  - 
  (0.049)  (0.016)  -  -  -  - 
Karonga  0.192  -0.281  0.226  -0.298  0.094  -0.452 
  (0.071)  (0.021)  (0.096)  (0.027)  (0.023)  (0.001) 
Mzuzu  0.191  -0.322  0.179  -0.321  0.153  -0.462 
  (0.015)  (0.021)  (0.057)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Salima  -  -  0.211  -0.322  0.358  -0.374 
  -  -  (0.025)  (0.014)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Chimbiya  0.294  -0.335  0.257  -0.282  0.242  -0.386 
  (0.034)  (0.025)  (0.036)  (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.006) 
Ntaja  0.129  -0.384  0.141  -0.252  0.164  -0.452 
  (0.046)  (0.019)  (0.062)  (0.003)  (0.090)  (0.076) 
Lunzu  0.221  -0.318  0.126  -0.299  0.224  -0.419 
  (0.077)  (0.024)  (0.078)  (0.021)  (0.078)  (0.090) 
Bangula  -  -  0.103  -0.263  0.396  -0.421 
  -  -  (0.978)  (0.023)  (0.000)  (0.003) 
Average  0.195  -0.322  0.177  -0.291  0.233  -0.424 
* Lilongwe market was taken as a dependent market. Figures in parenthesis are critical p-values   60 
The results in Table 8 showed that the contemporaneous change in  Lilongwe market prices 
significantly affected the price change in the other markets with the coefficients ranging from 
0.129 to 0.294, resulting in an average impact of 19.5% for full sample data set. During the Pre-
MACE the coefficients ranged from 0.126 to 0.257, resulting in an average impact of 17.7% 
with Bangula being insignificant. The impact of price changes in Lilongwe to other markets 
improved during the Post-MACE era with the coefficients ranging from 0.094 to 0.396 and, on 
average contemporaneous changes in rice prices in Lilongwe explained around 23% of changes 
in the other markets. However, Chirwa (2001) who reported Karonga as a central rice market 
observed that, on average, changes in rice prices in Karonga explained around 70 percent of 
changes in the peripheral markets. Nevertheless, the difference between Pre and Post-MACE 
was found to be significant at 5% level of significance (p= 0.0448, see Appendix 3) which 
implies that the MACE programme had an impact. 
 
With respect to the speed of adjustment parameter the coefficient of the lagged error correction 
term shows that the speed of adjustment to long-run equilibrium is slowest for Karonga (-0.281) 
and  highest  for  Ntaja  (-0.384),  and  about  32.2%  of  the  price  adjustment  to  the  long-run 
equilibrium takes place within a month for the full sample price series. During the Pre-MACE 
period  the  speed  of  adjustments  to  long-run  equilibrium  was  faster  in  Salima  (-0.322)  and 
slowest in Ntaja (-0.252) with an overall average of 29.1%.  
 
The study noted increased speed of adjustments during the Post-MACE period whereby the 
slowest speed of adjustment was reported as -0.374 in Salima and the fastest is -0.462 in Mzuzu. 
On average, about 42.2% of the price adjustments to the long-run equilibrium took place within 
a month for the Post-MACE period. These findings were also slightly different from Chirwa 
(2001)  where  the  coefficient  of  the  lagged  error  correction  term  showed  that  the  speed  of 
adjustment  was  slowest  for  Lilongwe  (-0.33)  and  highest  for  Mzuzu  (-0.67),  and  about  47   61 
percent of the price adjustment took place within a month. However, the difference between the 
period  before  and  after  commencement  of  the  MACE  project  was  found  to  be  statistically 
significant at 1% (p=0.0068, see Appendix 3).  
5.4.2  Long-Run Price Relationships: Impulse Response Functions 
Considering all markets, the time plot shows that both positive and negative shocks lead to 
almost a similar pattern of adjustment. Figure 7 below and figures 8 to 13 presented in the 
Appendix  1  illustrate  the  responses  to  positive  and  negative  shocks  of  the  price  parity 
relationships between Lilongwe market and an auxiliary market j for rice market prior to and 
after the MACE programme. For example, Figure 7 shows the response for the Karonga market 
to both positive and negative price shocks in Lilongwe. The diagram shows that the speed of 
response by the Karonga rice market to shocks in Lilongwe rice market was nine weeks in the 
pre-MACE period and seven weeks in the post-MACE period.   
   
Figure 8 represents how Mzuzu rice market responded to a one half standard deviation shock in 
Lilongwe rice market prior to and after the MACE intervention. It takes 7.5 weeks for Mzuzu 
market to respond to price shocks in Lilongwe market during the pre-MACE period and 6.5 
weeks during the post-MACE period. Figure 9 show little change in speed of response between 
Lilongwe and Salima markets for the pre- and post-MACE periods, both responses appear to be 
relatively complete by 7.5 weeks.  
 
Figure 10 shows the response of Chimbiya rice market to a one half standard deviation shock in 
Lilongwe rice market.  The responses are generally complete after seven weeks during pre-
MACE period and 6.5 weeks during post-MACE period. The rest of the Figures 11, 12 and 13 
also show improvement to the responses of auxiliary markets to the central market in the post-
MACE period. It takes 8.5 weeks for Ntaja, 7.0 weeks for Lunzu and 9.0 weeks for Bangula to   62 
respond to Lilongwe shocks during the pre-MACE period while the figures for the post-MACE 
period are 8.0 weeks for Ntaja, 6.0 weeks for Lunzu and 8.0 weeks for Bangula markets to 
respond to shocks in Lilongwe central market.  
 
Figure  7:  Response  of  Karonga  Rice  market  to  positive/negative  price  shocks  in  the                  
Lilongwe Rice market   
 
A general picture portrayed by this impulse response analysis in this study is that it took an 
average of about eight weeks for auxiliary markets to adjust completely in response to a price 
shock in Lilongwe rice market during the Pre-MACE period. An improved is observed for Post-
MACE era where an average of seven weeks was reported. Another key observation is that the 
positive and negative shocks converge to equilibrium and do not show any tendency to deviate 
from  equilibrium  in  the  long  run.  These  responses  are  consistent  with  long-run  market 
integration. It should, however, be noted that these responses are conditional on the size of the 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Summary and Conclusion 
It is increasingly recognized that the formulation of market-enhancing policies and initiatives to 
increase the performance of the markets  requires  a better understanding of how the market 
functions. Aggregate market performance is better understood by studying the level of market 
integration that exists.  In the context of this study market  performance was  investigated by 
studying the impact of MACE on average market prices in the rice markets in Malawi. A review 
of the literature showed that no study had been specifically done to measure the extent of market 
integration in this area. The primary objective of this study was to examine spatial rice market 
integration in Malawi and understand how it has been affected by MACE project.  
 
The  study  used  monthly  price  data  from  1994  to  2007.  The  study  noted  that  typical  of 
agricultural products, rice prices varied both in space and over time. The main rice producing 
areas such as Ntaja and Karonga reported lowest mean rice prices where as the main consuming 
regions  such  as  Lilongwe  and  Mzuzu  reported  highest  mean  rice  prices.  The  study  further 
observed the existence of seasonal variations which occur over the production cycle which is 
normally a period of twelve months. Seasonal variation is a function of relative changes in 
supply and demand as the marketing year progresses. It was therefore observed that rice prices 
are low during harvest and start rising thereafter, reaching the peak during the growing season.  
 
Co-integration test results have shown that compared to the period before MACE project, the 
extent of spatial rice market integration in Malawi appear to be improving in years following the 
commencement  of  the  project.  For  example,  market  locations,  such  as  Lunzu  and  Bangula, 
which  did  not  share  the  common  trend  with  the  main  consumption  markets  (Mzuzu  and 
Lilongwe) in Pre-MACE period, were integrated during the Post-MACE era.    64 
In addition, trace tests revealed the existence of four, five and six co-integrating vectors for full 
sample, Pre-MACE and Post-MACE price series respectively, which is also an indication of 
improved  market  integration.  These  results  provide  empirical  support  to  the  hypothesis  that 
provision of market information has the capacity to improve market performance.  
 
More  over  the  analysis  of  market  integration  using  the  vector  autoregression  co-integration 
approach and the test for the existence of valid co-integration vectors reveal that markets for rice 
given the price information are highly integrated in Malawi. Of particular importance is the fact 
that there are more integrated market links during the Post-MACE than the Pre-MACE period. 
For example, Pre-MACE period reported 58.93% integrated links while Post-MACE reported 
73.21% integrated links and this proportional difference was found to be significant at 1% level 
(P=0.0006). It can therefore be concluded that the market information system advanced by the 
project is on average increasing spatial market integration. However, the fact that other links 
show  no  co-integration  especially  those  involving  Bangula  market  is  an  indication  that  the 
government need to invest a lot in other sectors such as infrastructure like roads.   
 
The causality test results also indicated improved rice market integration in recent years. For 
example, feedback relationships were found to be more manifested during the Post-MACE era. 
The study noted 22.22% bi-directional causalities during the Pre-MACE and 38.89% during the 
Post-MACE. This proportional difference was found to be significant at 5% level. Furthermore, 
the pattern of causality in the Post-MACE period pointed out to the existence of two major 
centres, namely Mzuzu and Lilongwe that are pivotal in the transmission of price signals to 
other markets. However, these causality results have reinforced the shortcomings of bivariate 
market  integration  models,  where  a  central  location  is  assumed  to  be  exogenous,  i.e.,  to 
dominate the long run price movements.  
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In  our  analyses,  if  Mzuzu  and  Lilongwe  were  indeed  exogenous  locations,  then  the  causal 
relationship would have been unidirectional, which is not the case in this study. As such the 
study failed to identify a central rice market in Malawi. 
   
On  the  dynamic  adjustments  the  study  also  noted  an  improvement  in  spatial  rice  market 
integration  in  Malawi.  The  study  observed  that  price  changes  in  Lilongwe  explained  about 
23.00% of the changes in other markets during the Post-MACE relative to 17.70% Lilongwe 
price changes explained during the Pre-MACE period. This difference was significant at 5% 
level (P=0.0448) which implies that MACE intervention is significantly improving the impact 
Lilongwe market is having on other markets in influencing price changes. The study further 
observed that the speed of the adjustment parameter had also improved with the genesis of 
MACE project. About 42.20% of the price adjustments took place within a month during Post-
MACE  era  compared  to  29.10%  for  Pre-MACE  period.  This  proportional  difference  was 
significant at 1% (P=0.0068). This implies that more price changes in the major urban markets 
were transmitted to peripheral markets within a shortest time possible. 
 
The  overall  picture  emerging  from  this  analysis  is  that  Malawi  Agricultural  Commodity 
Exchange project is enhancing spatial rice market integration. As such an important lesson that 
can be learnt from the MACE experiment is that market information system has the capacity to 
improve the extent of price transmission across spatially separated markets and that serious 
initiatives  should  be  undertaken.  This  then  may  be  translated  to  improving  of  market 
performance and efficiency in agricultural sector which is a key to sustainable household food 
security  realisation.  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  MACE  by  itself  can  not  achieve  a 
structural change in market integration unless investments in marketing infrastructure such as 
transportation, communication, etc. are undertaken. 
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6.2 Recommendations 
Based on the findings of this study, the study makes the following recommendations: 
 
  Much  as  MACE  project  is  perceived  to  be  improving  market  integration  in  Malawi 
serious investments need also to be made in infrastructure development such as roads 
and  communication  in  order  to  realise  significant  structural  change  in  market 
performance through reduction of transaction and other transfer costs. 
 
  The identification of Lilongwe and Mzuzu markets as pivotal in the transmission of price 
signals to other markets implies that government can influence the prices of rice and 
other food crops in the rural markets through market operations that can influence supply 
and  demand  in  these  markets.  The  government  can  also  facilitate  price  stabilisation 
efforts through the market mechanism, by targeting markets that are highly integrated.  
 
  This  study  has  also  shown  that  market-enhancing  interventions  are  working  well,  as 
such; MACE project needs to be promoted and be expanded to cover a wider area of the 
country. It should be able to reach even the remotest areas of the country.  
 
  MACE needs further improvements in systematic collection, compilation and storage of 
price  and  structural  information  on  trade  flows,  transaction  and  other  transfer  costs. 
Availability  of  this  data  will  enable  further  understanding  of  factors  contributing  to 
market integration of not only rice markets but also other agricultural commodities. 
 
  MACE  also  needs  to  consider  timeliness  of  widespread  dissemination  for  this 
information:  if  market  participants  have  accurate  and  timely  information  on  market 
conditions, rice and in general, food markets may be able to respond more quickly to 
market shocks, and market linkages can efficiently and effectively distribute food from 
surplus to deficit areas.   67 
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Figure  8:  Response  of  Mzuzu  Rice  market  to  positive/negative  price  shocks  in  the                  





Figure  9:  Response  of  Salima  Rice  Market  to  positive/negative  price  shocks  in  the 
Lilongwe Rice market 
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Figure  10:  Response  of  Chimbiya  Rice  market  to  positive/negative  price  shocks  in  the                  
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Figure  12:  Response  of  Lunzu  Rice  Market  to  positive/negative  price  shocks  in  the 





Figure  13:  Response  of  Bangula  Rice  market  to  positive/negative  price  shocks  in  the 
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Appendix 2: Proportional Difference Test 
To  test  for  proportional  difference  for  Pre-MACE  and  Post-MACE  periods  for  a  given  co-
integration parameter, Z-test was performed as follows. 
0 : ij H p p   
0 : ij H p p   
    11
ij






















z = Standard normal cumulative probabilities 
i p = Proportional of Pre-MACE 
j p = Proportional of Post-MACE 
c p  = Pooled estimate of  i p  and  j p  
i x = Number of co-integrated markets during the Pre-MACE  
j x = Number of co-integrated markets during the Post-MACE 
i n = Total number of markets during the Pre-MACE  
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Co-integrated Markets  58.93  73.21  0.0006 
       
Unidirectional Causality  61.11  50.00  0.7486 
       
Bi-directional Causality  22.22  38.89  0.0147 
       
Independent Causality  16.67  11.11  0.6844 
       
Magnitude of Price Shock Transmitted from 
Market i to Market j  17.70 
 
23.00  0.0448 
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